IDS mailing list archives

RE: Views and Correlation in Intrusion Detection


From: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 19:53:32 -0400

Actually, smart money says you need to look at the sixth packet before
deciding.  It could be a probe for the existence of the service that was
potentially vulnerable to the other five attacks, a borked attempt at one of
the other five attacks, or just a continuation of one of the other five
attacks (lets say, for example, that the attacker is on a DSL line, and
therefore has an MTU of about 1490).  This is one of the things that makes
correlation so tricky...you've got to have eyes on the data to be able to
draw conclusions.  I'd say that of all the possible things I can think of,
though, an unknown attack is the least likely scenario in this case.

-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen P. Berry [mailto:spb () meshuggeneh net] 
Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2003 8:31 PM
To: DAVID MARKLE
Cc: Blake Matheny; focus-ids () securityfocus com; spb () meshuggeneh net
Subject: Re: Views and Correlation in Intrusion Detection 


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DAVID MARKLE writes:

An IDS alert is ONLY relevant if the
firewall permits the traffic through.  To further the comment, and 
attack signature tripped for (known attack) xyz, is ONLY 
relevant when 
the attacked host is vulnerable to xyz.  This is the ultimate job of 
correlation.  If the above surrounding conditions are true, the 
severity of the attack becomes increased to critical, 
otherwise it is 
informational only.

I disagree.  If you see six packets from a single source and 
five of them match five discrete attack signatures and your 
NIDS doesn't tell you anything about the sixth, the smart 
money says that someone just tried five attacks you know 
about and one you don't.  If you're ignoring the five 
(because you know you're safe from them), you just missed the 
sixth (which is the one you're going to get paged about a 
couple hours later)[0].

If you're about to suggest that disambiguating this sort of 
situation isn't something that most NIDS products do well 
(or, indeed, at all), ya got me there.  But, alas, we have 
not yet found a way to convince the blackhats to only attack 
us in such ways as we find convienient to monitor[1].  The 
question you've got to ask yourself is what your NIDS is 
there for:  to behave such that it does not inconvienience 
your incident analysts, or to behave in such a way as to 
catch the maximum number of bad guys[2].







- -spb

- -----
0     Random aside:  try to express what I've just described using the
      IDMEF.
1     Certainly not in the general case.  Honeynets and such things
      undoubtedly work for some situations.
2     Of course this is a min/max problem, and neither extreme is
      optimal.

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Attend the Black Hat Briefings & Training, July 28 - 31 in Las Vegas, the
world's premier technical IT security event! 10 tracks, 15 training sessions,
1,800 delegates from 30 nations including all of the top experts, from CSO's to
"underground" security specialists.  See for yourself what the buzz is about!
Early-bird registration ends July 3.  This event will sell out. www.blackhat.com
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