IDS mailing list archives

RE: how to verify whether an attack attempt is successful?


From: Ron Gula <ronald.gula () verizon net>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2003 12:08:19 -0500


->Is there any technology developed in this direction?

A lot of NIDS look for responses with their signatures. Some NIDS (like
NFR) look at the entire session and evaluate the results of an attack
along with detecting the attack in the first place.

Other NIDS like Dragon, have stand-alone signatures which look for
post-attack activity. One of my favorite Dragon examples was this
sort of log where you can see a buffer overflow occur, and then see
the actual shell commands the hacker is running. Other times when
you don't know about the buffer overflow, you can still look for things
like Microsoft Windows banners on high ports which occur for many
of the W2K overflows.

Still other approaches like Lancope's Stealthwatch take an entirely
different approach. They can identify a 'potentially hostile' scanning
IP by watching the IP probe ports and systems. If that particular IP
starts to establish a 'long' connection, the assumption is that they
scanned for a vulnerability, and then were able to exploit a vulnerability.
Pretty interesting because it does not use packet content as a
signature source.

Lastly, someone mentioned IDS and VA correlation. That is what I
am working on now at Tenable. Looking at Dragon, Snort and Realsecure,
breaking down the attacks by CVE and then correlating these with
vulnerability checks by CVE with Nessus, about 40% of the events
generated by these NIDS stands a chance of being directly correlated
to a vulnerability. Not all NIDS events correlate to a vulnerability. Think
of events like port scans and brute force login attempts. These don't
directly correlate. And when you do have a particular vulnerability, the
NIDS may have a general check for that which can't be correlated and
vice versa. I wrote a short paper on the topic at:

http://www.tenablesecurity.com/paper.html

It outlines some high level thought on issues with direct VA and IDS
correlation.

On the host side, tools like Tripwire can catch when key system files
have been modified by unsophisticated hackers, but it is a really good
way to indicate that your system has been compromised.

Ron Gula, CTO
Tenable Network Security
http://www.tenablesecurity.com







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