RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots

[pbsarnac () thoughtworks com]

I think you're trying too hard to find negatives with the system. There are
many situations where this would not be an acceptable tool, however there
are many situations where this could be invaluable. It seems perfectly
suited for detecting insider attacks, especially against high-risk and
high-value servers that by their very nature require higher levels of
protection and can therefore justify higher levels of effort and time.

In the end, this is simply one more tool for our toolboxes, and shouldn't
be considered as a solution in and of itself.



|---------+---------------------------->
|         |           "Rob Shein"      |
|         |           <shoten@starpower|
|         |           .net>            |
|         |                            |
|         |           02/21/2003 04:07 |
|         |           PM               |
|---------+---------------------------->
  
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |                                                                                                                     
     |
  |       To:       "'Augusto Paes de Barros'" <augusto () paesdebarros com br>, "'Jordan K Wiens'" <jwiens () nersp 
nerdc ufl edu>|
  |       cc:       <focus-ids () securityfocus com>                                                                    
        |
  |       Subject:  RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots                                                      
     |
  
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|




At what point does this concept get too unwieldy?  In this scenario, people
have to have knowledge of the various types of LDAP traffic (and know how
to
differentiate them on the wire) in order to write the rules to catch a
single type of honeytoken.  I certainly don't have that breadth of
knowledge, and I've learned how to do a whole lot of different things.
There are workarounds for almost anything under the sun, but some of them
require workarounds that make them infeasible.  I think the overhead in
terms of administration and and braintrust that would be needed to seed an
enterprise with such granular honey-things is better spent on other ways of
securing that enterprise.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Augusto Paes de Barros [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br]
> Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 4:56 PM
> To: 'Rob Shein'; 'Jordan K Wiens'
> Cc: focus-ids () securityfocus com
> Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
>
>
> True! But you can configure the rule on the IDS to catch the
> honeytoken on all traffic BUT the traffic between the servers.
>
> []s
> Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP
> www.paesdebarros.com.br
>
>
> -----Mensagem original-----
> De: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net]
> Enviada em: sexta-feira, 21 de fevereiro de 2003 17:46
> Para: 'Jordan K Wiens'
> Cc: 'Augusto Paes de Barros'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
> Assunto: RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
>
>
> Yeah, but if you have more than one LDAP server, and
> replication, you'll also snag other valid traffic that
> happens to control the objects in LDAP.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jordan K Wiens [mailto:jwiens () nersp nerdc ufl edu]
> > Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 3:13 PM
> > To: Rob Shein
> > Cc: 'Augusto Paes de Barros'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
> > Subject: RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
> >
> >
> > The point seems to be that it's possible to be eblow-deep
> in someones
> > networks with relatively 'normal' traffic the IDS won't pick up.  A
> > specifically designed web-crawler can sneak right under the
> radar of a
> > typical IDS, yet it would easily be detected by a
> honeytoken.  Slowly
> > enumerating all users from a public LDAP directory probably
> won't be
> > detected by the IDS, but a honeytoken would snag it.
> >
> > --
> > Jordan Wiens
> > UF Network Incident Response Team
> > (352)392-2061
> >
> > On Fri, 21 Feb 2003, Rob Shein wrote:
> >
> > > Interesting notion, but with a few problems.  My idea of
> a honeypot
> > > was an untrusted machine that draws fire, so to say, from
> > an attacker.
> > > In doing so, it serves the dual roles of concentrating the
> > attacking
> > > traffic onto a segment that is far more homogenous (in terms of
> > > activity) and therefore easier to monitor, and causing the
> > attacker to
> > > focus on a system that will not give him access to
> anything of any
> > > importance.  Putting "honey documents" or other data
> (like database
> > > entries or LDAP objects) in the midst of valid data will not draw
> > > attention away, and even if they did, detection of them
> > wouldn't get
> > > you anything new.  If your IDS sees the content that it is
> > to look for
> > > in these documents, why wouldn't it have seen any of the
> attacking
> > > traffic to begin with?  And either way, the bad guy is already
> > > elbows-deep in your goodies at that point.
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Augusto Paes de Barros
> [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br]
> > > > Sent: Friday,
> February 21, 2003 6:18 AM
> > > > To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
> > > > Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting
> views. Why use
> > > > only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use accounts,
> > > > documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that I call
> > > > "honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically,
> information
> > > > that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, if you
> can detect
> > > > it, something wrong is happening.
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP http://www.paesdebarros.com.br
> > > > augusto () paesdebarros com br
>
>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------
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> If not, see what you're missing.
> Download a free 15-day trial of StillSecure Border Guard.
> http://www.securityfocus.com/stillsecure


-----------------------------------------------------------
Does your IDS have Intelligent Attack Profiling?
If not, see what you're missing.
Download a free 15-day trial of StillSecure Border Guard.
http://www.securityfocus.com/stillsecure





-----------------------------------------------------------
Does your IDS have Intelligent Attack Profiling?
If not, see what you're missing.
Download a free 15-day trial of StillSecure Border Guard.
http://www.securityfocus.com/stillsecure