IDS mailing list archives

RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


From: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 14:32:40 -0500

Interesting notion, but with a few problems.  My idea of a honeypot was an
untrusted machine that draws fire, so to say, from an attacker.  In doing
so, it serves the dual roles of concentrating the attacking traffic onto a
segment that is far more homogenous (in terms of activity) and therefore
easier to monitor, and causing the attacker to focus on a system that will
not give him access to anything of any importance.  Putting "honey
documents" or other data (like database entries or LDAP objects) in the
midst of valid data will not draw attention away, and even if they did,
detection of them wouldn't get you anything new.  If your IDS sees the
content that it is to look for in these documents, why wouldn't it have seen
any of the attacking traffic to begin with?  And either way, the bad guy is
already elbows-deep in your goodies at that point.

-----Original Message-----
From: Augusto Paes de Barros [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br] 
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 6:18 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why 
use only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use 
accounts, documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that 
I call "honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically, 
information that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, 
if you can detect it, something wrong is happening.

--
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP
http://www.paesdebarros.com.br
augusto () paesdebarros com br



-----Mensagem original-----
De: Lance Spitzner [mailto:lance () honeynet org]
Enviada em: quinta-feira, 20 de fevereiro de 2003 15:59
Para: Robert Graham
Cc: Focus on Intrusion Detection Systems; slyph () alum mit edu
Assunto: Re: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


On Wed, 19 Feb 2003, Robert Graham wrote:

People have been hoping that there is some sort of magic-pill 
technology
that
solves the problem of IDS. "Protocol-anomaly detection" is one of 
those buzzwords that promises a magic pill.

Okay, I'll admit, to me alot of the security problems I see 
are nothing more then nails, and honeypots are the hammer.  
However, seriously, have folks considered the detection 
capabilities of honeypots?  The reason I bring this up in 
this thread, is for honeypots, everything is an anamoly.  The 
concept of a honeypot is it has no production or authorized 
activity. Everything it captures its way is most likely 
malicious activity.  Not only that, but you dramaticaly 
reduce 'noise'.  Instead of dealing with 5,000 alerts a day 
(not that high of a number for many organizations) a honeypot 
in the same environment could only generate 5 or 10 alerts a 
day, alerts you most likely need to take action on.  These 
small data sets can make it far easier and cost effective to 
identify and act on unauthorized activity.

I'm in no way suggesting that honeypots replace any existing 
detection technologies, I'm suggesting that can contribute.  
Personally, I feel the concept of deception has overshadowed 
the value of honeypots, when one of their true values lies in 
detection.

lance


-----------------------------------------------------------
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-----------------------------------------------------------
Does your IDS have Intelligent Attack Profiling?
If not, see what you're missing.
Download a free 15-day trial of StillSecure Border Guard. 
http://www.securityfocus.com/stillsecure



-----------------------------------------------------------
Does your IDS have Intelligent Attack Profiling?
If not, see what you're missing.
Download a free 15-day trial of StillSecure Border Guard.
http://www.securityfocus.com/stillsecure


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