Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: Example of WMF Exploit SPAM Targetting Schools?


From: David Gillett <gillettdavid () FHDA EDU>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2006 09:54:43 -0800

  I recall that, a few years back, it was common for Microsoft
to downplay IE bugs with this "must get user to visit a
suspicious site" argument.
  And then some hacker crew broke into a hosting company and
defaced 500+ legit websites, adding code that exploited some
of those vulnerabilities.

  The notion that users can have any real idea, a priori, about
the actual safety of any site is just false.

  [On average, I'd agree that some sites are *more likely* than
others to be booby-trapped, and that factor may have its place
in the policy and "user education" sides of security management.
But I don't think it's really useful in assessing the severity
of a vulnerability.]

David Gillett


-----Original Message-----
From: Russell Fulton [mailto:r.fulton () AUCKLAND AC NZ]
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 10:44 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Example of WMF Exploit SPAM
Targetting Schools?

Gary Flynn wrote:


         Mitigating Factors for Graphics Rendering Engine
Vulnerability
         - CVE-2005-4560:

"In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to
force users
to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have
to persuade
users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to
click a link
in an e-mail or Instant Messenger request that takes users to the
attacker's Web site."

Not much of a mitigating factor in my mind. Any half way
decent social
engineering attack would be better than 80% effective
unless everyone
was being told "don't click anything because your
computer's security
has been completely compromised by a safety defect" or some other
equally politically difficult drastic measures were in place.

You don't even need that.  At the beginning of the attack I
set up argus to record the first 100 characters of each
outbound session on port 80 and then examined the urls that
whose downloads triggered my snort rules.

The most persistent source addresses were in 85.255.112-119.
These addresses will be well known to anyone who has looked
at the source of spyware recently.  The addresses are
registered to a hosting company based in the Ukraine but
traceroute suggest they are being used in the US (at least
the immediate upstream is a major US ISP).

All the url seem to be referred from porn sites.  It is not
clear if these sites have been compromised to redirect
suckers to the malicious web sites or if they are willing
participants in this scam.

All the active addresses were supplied to MS via ISC but MS
failed to get them shut down.  Hmmm....

It is misleading of MS to suggest that this requires user
action when in fact all that is required is that the victim
visit a malicious web site which may be hosting other
'legitimate' material.

Moral:  don't use windows to view porn :)

Russell


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