WebApp Sec mailing list archives
RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing
From: "Eric McCarty" <eric () piteduncan com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 09:25:46 -0800
One example would be using PGP encrypted e-mail. If the mail is not encrypted with a trusted key, instant drop/deny. Your right, managing this would be tough but there are dedicated staffs which maintain Keys, Address Lists and oversee the approval/denial of potential senders based off their need to communicate with the organization. If you think about it, you usually have the people you need to communicate with in your address lists, so denying messages from senders not in your Address list would not result in losing any e-mail. The problem with phishing is not (imnsho) corporate users, its home users who don't know any better. The only solution to phishing is education, simple as that. Or we could unplug the internet?. =P -----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 1:56 AM To: Lyal Collins Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing You are talking about a secure email _network_, where only "trusted" people can send emails to members. (i.e: a private mailing list). You are suggesting a trusted system like this, right? And your argument is that non-trusteds (phishers) can't get in and send emails - fine, it may be true (depending on membership verification process). How does this list communicate with the outside world? Customers? Banks? ...? Do they have to become "trusted" too ? On what basis ? Email address? Certificate? Who manages all this trust? Whats the change-over timeframe to get the world onto this system as opposed to the current one ? I'm still a little confused as to what you are suggesting the solution (the pratical solution) is here... because setting up such a trusted network just isn't possible (and has been tried before, hasn't it ?) If your idea is just about having a way to trust specific peoples' messages (certificates) then fine, it's a system that would work on a positive basis (customer: "Yes, this is from my bank, because the little padlock is there..!") but not on a negative basis (customer: "Hmm, it says its from my bank, but there is no pad lock... I will click it anyway ... those banks, always stuffing things up."). Implemented with my idea[1] from a long time ago, however, it could be neat :) But I still don't see your problem with Client-side certificates. -- Michael [1] http://michaelsilk.blogspot.com/2004/11/article-solution-to-phishing.htm l On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 18:54:46 +1100, Lyal Collins <lyal.collins () key2it com au> wrote:
The attraction of secure emails are that 'phishers' have to compromise
every recipient's mailbox/secure email solution in the world, THEN launch a phishing attack against customers of select bank in order to get the rate of return they do today. This seems a much harder, and less profitable sequence a phisher must go through, which has a higher probability of detection and convictability, increasing deterrence and decreasing the phishers
payback.
Lyal-----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, 24 January 2005 6:42 PM To: Lyal Collins Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Thats not really "Phishing" though, is it? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) It is on one hand in that they are lured to the site, but they don't provide any information, it is stolen from them by the malware. Sure, it's a problem that must be dealt with but to say that client side certificates are useless due to that is silly because that (compromised system) is a problem _no matter what_ solution is implemented ("secure" emails). -- Michael Lyal said:-----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, 24 January 2005 3:24 PM To: lyal.collins () key2it com au; webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal said:The difference is that client-side SSL exists today in anindustrystandard platform independent manner that could be effectively deployed. (management is a different issue that I will be acoward andignore for now.)It's hard to see how changing the locaiton of a password verification actually makes any difference to accountholder security or phishing.Is it? Surely it's easy to see. Phishing requries theuser to enterthe password in a website. If they don't need to do this (or only enter partial password) because of certificate, then I think it's pretty easy to see how that is an advantage.Seen the newer generaitons of phishing, where going to thefaked bank siteloads up the user's PC with spyware, keyloggers et al? Certificates are compromised as soon as any malware entersthe machine -which is useless in this phishing scenario.And then there's the pragmatic fact that people will payMicrosoftprotection-racket funds for Microsoft anti-spyware to protect themselves transparently in the background from thecrappy softwareMicrosoft *SOLD* them in the first place...and they will dothis longbefore they'll use any of the "secure email" solutions today that require user interaction & thought. But I'm all for an global standard secure email solution ifyou happento have one of those handy,Actually, my company does - if anyone wants to buy it.Global, is it? Who buys it then? How does it work? Careto share moredetails, because there is not much information on yoursite. Doesn'tseem any different to what PGP would provide. It's also rather interesting that you claim it "encrypts"everything,but also analyses it for spam, viruses ... now just how does it do that :) ? And what is "content checked". Seems far to "big brother" for my
liking.
Current thread:
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing, (continued)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 27)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 27)