Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

RE: Bug in Norton FireWall 2003


From: Michael Wojcik <Michael.Wojcik () microfocus com>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2003 15:38:33 -0700

From: nowak.a () pg com [mailto:nowak.a () pg com] 
Sent: Monday, August 11, 2003 5:15 PM


I suppose a simple defense for "personal firewall" vendors 
against this sort of thing would be to use hard-to-guess window
titles for their popups...

This simple defense may not be enough, as there are ways to 
find out the names of all "child" windows belonging to specific
process.

Agreed.  "simple" wasn't really the adjective I wanted; something more like
"preliminary" or "first-cut" was what I meant.  Another possibility would be
to require that the window be visible when the event is received, and have
been visible for some minimum time (even on the order of a few seconds),
which would allow an alert user to see the trojan in action, anyway.

Some firewall products of this type allow a "reject without prompting"
configuration, which is safer, albeit potentially frustrating.  (I'm
familiar with the Symantec products, and getting log information out of them
is not a pleasant process.  Their UIs in general are not well-designed.)

Is there a reliable mechanism in Windows for distinguishing between real and
spoofed events?  I've never looked into the subject, as I avoid GUI-mode
programming like the plague (which is an apt description, in my book).

Of course, the popup window shouldn't be owned by a process running with
elevated privileges anyway.

-- 
Michael Wojcik
Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus


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