Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

Re: Covert Channels


From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf () dione ids pl>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 18:56:12 -0400 (EDT)

On 23 Oct 2002, Frank Knobbe wrote:

I think it was Jose who used the example of a rogue broker accessing
websites in a certain order. While valid traffic, shouldn't it be
possible to detect that behavior?

One more thing - look in your web logs. Quite frankly, I'd qualify many of
my human visitors as covert channel agents or such. People reload pages
with no purpose, often visit them several times in a row, click on same
links a number of times, click on quite random links, some people have one
hour delays, others just read first few words and have few second delays,
list directories in each possible sort variant, mistype URLs five times in
a row, even manage to append to URLs in their address bar... It's really
next to impossible to profile it without having a model loose enough to
miss even a lousy hidden covert channel. If your network has more than 100
users, I think the only thing you'd achieve is identifying a number of
normal users as a suspicious software, and completely missing low profile
covert channel agents ;-)

-- 
------------------------- bash$ :(){ :|:&};: --
 Michal Zalewski * [http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx]
    Did you know that clones never use mirrors?
--------------------------- 2002-10-23 18:51 --


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