Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

RE: Winnt/Win2k Vuln ?


From: Louis-Eric Simard <Louis-Eric () Simard com>
Date: Sun, 12 Aug 2001 02:49:05 -0400

At 09:51 PM 11/08/2001 -0700, David Schwartz wrote:

Louis-Eric Simard wrote:

> The major distinction here should one of action-domain constraints;

        Exactly.

> As we are limited by the fact that the shoddy name space is now
> prevalent,
> then context needs to be taken into account. As one types in a
> URL without
> specifying the underlying protocol (http:// or file://), there
> should be no
> ambiguity that the expected protocol is http, just as we do not naturally
> expect file system requests to be carried over the web. The fix is in
> filling-in missing protocol details, within logical usage
> contexts, before
> the request allocator gets a chance to goof it up.

For the record, I have submitted complaints/requests to the coders of both
IE and Netscape arguing that, for example, 'ftp.microsoft.com' should be
interpreted as 'http://ftp.microsoft.com&apos; and not 'ftp://ftp.microsoft.com&apos;
(and analogously, the brower should not try to figure out what the user
meant (ESP?) but should have a consistent default). I was basically laughed
at by both Microsoft and Netscape.

I don't think it's unreasonable to have different operating modes where
different defaults take place. For example, when acting as a 'file manager',
file:// can be the default protocol. However, IMO, in ALL cases, the
fully-qualified URL of the site/file you wind up at MUST be shown to the
user. It is a serious error to abbreviate the displayed URL as IE does. I do
not believe Netscape does this.

        DS

Right. The other consequence of the muddled/"guessed" semantics is that misspelled, URL-less filenames (those, by lieu of their misspelling, not found on the drive), end up as keyword queries (in IE, to auto.search.msn.com; in Netscape, in a less ususal scenario [eg, mistyping in a way that causes the filename period to be missing]) transmitted in the clear, opening up some privacy/confidentiality/security problems.

Having distinct access tools for distinct information domains solves, on the surface, this problem (less so when you bring plug-ins, web-enriched directories, shared protocols, etc. into the picture), but limits the possibilities for conversant data access; going for multi-domain access using unified tools requires that some intelligence be injected into the process. Both cases would require more responsible engineering than what we have now.

Cheers,

 + Louis-Eric Simard
   The Freedom Factory, Inc.


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