Snort mailing list archives

Re: Generic SQL injection false positives


From: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl_lists () tx rr com>
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2009 20:50:52 -0600

Now that I've had some time to think about this, I do not think that 
normalization will remove these.  I suspect that they will be passed to 
the sql server.

The problem with trying to detect them is this.  If you use content:"foo"; 
nocase; first, and then pcre:"/^foo$/i"; next, content will never match, 
so pcre will never be checked.  But to catch every possible instance you 
would have to try to match on the /**/ first, then strip it from the 
content and match on update.  I don't think snort can do that.

To bypass detection, I could use any one of the following: D/**/ROP, 
DR/**/OP or DRO/**/P.  How would you test for all those instances?  In a 
simple rule that's designed to detect "generic" sql injection, I think you 
stick with detecting update and set.

If you want to catch instances of comments inserted into sql injection, 
you would need a separate rule that attempts to detect the evasion. 
Considering that urls normally have forward slashes in them, that would 
not be easy to do.

--On December 28, 2009 6:40:42 PM -0600 Paul Schmehl 
<pschmehl_lists () tx rr com> wrote:

I believe normalization will remove those as well, but someone from
Sourcefire will have to confirm that.

--On December 29, 2009 12:15:53 AM +0000 Guise McAllaster
<guise.mcallaster () gmail com> wrote:

Sure:

http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injection-cheatsheet-oku/

Search for "/**/"

A good point somebody says is that we need to know what exactly the
URL normalization is done so we can know what it eliminates.  Some
like "%20" and "+" or "++" are sure recognized but others?  What are
they?

Snort has been victim to some bypasses in the past (no offense, VRT).

Guise

On 12/28/09, Paul Schmehl <pschmehl_lists () tx rr com> wrote:
Can you provide an example of that?

--On December 28, 2009 4:15:20 PM -0600 Guise McAllaster
<guise.mcallaster () gmail com> wrote:


From what I've seen, some SQLi will work using "/**/" instead of
spaces.  Other bypasses are possible as well I thinks.  Others want to
contribute some useful bypasses to spaces?

Guise

On 12/28/09, Paul Schmehl <pschmehl_lists () tx rr com> wrote:
--On December 28, 2009 12:10:37 PM -0600 Matt Olney
<molney () sourcefire com> wrote:

I see a lot of false positive for generic SQL injection rules.  For
example, SID 13514 shown here:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"SQL
generic sql update injection attempt"; flow:established,to_server;
content:"update"; nocase; pcre:"/update[^\n]*set/i"; metadata:policy
security-ips drop, service http;
reference:url,www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html;
classtype:web-application-attack; sid:13514; rev:4;)

Alas it alerts for normal traffic like this:

GET /get_updates_1/assessment/frameset_yellow.asp  HTTP/1.1

I don't see how a sql injection attempt is going to begin with any
character other than a space preceding it.  How would the sql engine
be able to parse that?  ISTM that the update could simply be anchored
on both sides; e.g pcre:"$update^/i";  For update to work, the only
thing that can be on either side of it is a non-alpha character or a
single quote, which the sql parser will discard.  If you want to
include set (which makes sense), I would make it a separate
detection.  A typical update statement would be UPDATE table SET
blah='foo' where blah='bar' or blah like '%doo%';

Something like this would be better, in my opinion.

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"SQL
generic sql update injection attempt"; flow:established,to_server;
content:"update"; nocase; pcre:"/$update^/i"; content:"set"; nocase;
pcre:"/$set^/i"; metadata:policy security-ips drop, service http;
reference:url,www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html;
classtype:web-application-attack; sid:13514; rev:5;)

Mind you, I haven't tested it, but it would certainly eliminate the
false positive given in the example.

Paul Schmehl, If it isn't already
obvious, my opinions are my own
and not those of my employer.
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Paul Schmehl, If it isn't already
obvious, my opinions are my own
and not those of my employer.
******************************************
WARNING: Check the headers before replying






Paul Schmehl, If it isn't already
obvious, my opinions are my own
and not those of my employer.
******************************************
WARNING: Check the headers before replying



Paul Schmehl, If it isn't already
obvious, my opinions are my own
and not those of my employer.
******************************************
WARNING: Check the headers before replying


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Take advantage of Verizon's best-in-class app development support
A streamlined, 14 day to market process makes app distribution fast and easy
Join now and get one step closer to millions of Verizon customers
http://p.sf.net/sfu/verizon-dev2dev 
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