DH exchange: conspiracy or ignorance?

[elebanidze at cigital.com (Evgeny Lebanidze)]

Yes, this is certainly bad and a very interesting finding.  These checks should clearly be present.  Are there serious 
practical ramifications of this problem though?  In other words, how likely is it that the generated public key in the 
DH key exchange will actually be 0 or 1?  It can certainly happen, but our passive attacker would have to be passive 
for a very long time and there is no guarantee that the secret key they might eventually get will be of interest to 
them (since the attacker cannot control when a weak public key is produced).  Just a thought.

Evgeny

-------------------------------------------------
Evgeny Lebanidze
Senior Security Consultant, Cigital
703-585-5047, http://www.cigital.com
Software Confidence.  Achieved.


-----Original Message-----
From: sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org] On Behalf Of Kowsik
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2007 1:24 AM
To: SC-L at securecoding.org
Subject: [SC-L] DH exchange: conspiracy or ignorance?

http://labs.musecurity.com/2007/09/18/widespread-dh-implementation-weakness/

K.

ps: I work for Mu.
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