Secure Coding mailing list archives

Catching up, and some retrospective thoughts


From: jepstein at webmethods.com (Jeremy Epstein)
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2007 20:07:33 -0400

I've just caught up with 6 weeks of backlogged messages in this group,
and wanted to offer some thoughts on topics that have been hashed out,
but haven't seen these points made.

(1) SOX is a waste, as several people said, because it's just a way to
give auditors more ways to demand irrelevant things on checklists - but
not to pay attention to actual security.  I've had customers demand that
I support AES because their auditors says "SOX requires it", while
meanwhile having unchanged default passwords.  Another customer demanded
that we support 6144 bit RSA keys (no, that's not a typo) because "SOX
requires it".  Neither customer asked anything about software security -
just about the check boxes on the auditor's list.  Ask people to go
*read* SOX, and they'll be surprised what it actually says (or more
accurately, doesn't say).

(2) PCI, by contrast, is dramatically better, because it's got actual
things you can measure, and some of them have some relevance to software
security.  However, it's having an effect that I think was unintended by
the folks who wrote it (or at least the ones I met at a recent
conference) - merchants are pushing the requirements down to all of
their suppliers, regardless of whether they're applicable.  So, for
example, we have to certify that we treat all credit card information in
the required way - even though we don't ever get credit card numbers.
[This is a requirement that might make sense for a merchant to push to
an outsourced processor, but not to a software supplier.  Can you
certify that Windows or Linux handles credit card numbers correctly?]

(3) Vendors do what their customers ask for.  If my customers ask for
better security, we'll put our engineering resources into improving
security - just as Microsoft has done.  If our customers ask for more
whizbang cool GUIs, that's where we'll put our effort.  We *know* that
the products aren't as secure as they could be (and perhaps should be) -
but as a business, we respond to our customers.  I hear what customers
are asking for, and when it comes to enterprise software, the top three
priorities are features, more features, and yet more features.  And we
actually have a metric for whether we're investing in the right places:
how often do we lose deals because of missing features (security or
otherwise) vs. security assurance (i.e., software security).  [Of course
there are other reasons for losing deals too, like price, long term
vision, company reputation, etc., but I'm focusing on the software
ones.]  When the balance of where we lose deals changes, we change our
investments.

As always, my opinions, which don't necessarily represent the views of
my employer, or Alberto Gonzales or anyone else tapping my phone.

--Jeremy

Jeremy Epstein
Senior Director, Product Security & Performance
P 703.460.5852 | C 703.989.8907 | F 703.460.2599 | W 202.456.1111
AIM jeremyepstein | Skype jjepstein
www.webMethods.com



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