RISKS Forum mailing list archives
Risks Digest 32.45
From: RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 13:51:18 PST
RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 18 January 2021 Volume 32 : Issue 45 ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/32.45> The current issue can also be found at <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt> Contents: Bursts of acceleration in Tesla vehicles caused by drivers mistaking accelerators for brakes, feds conclude (Ian Duncan) Riot in the Capitol is a nightmare scenario for cybersecurity professionals (Tonya Riley) Post-Riot, the Capitol Hill IT Staff Faces a Security Mess (WiReD) The Parler API was open without authentication. One or more third parties have done full downloads (Ars Technica) ESS voting machine company sends threats (Andrew Appel) IPhone12 will stop your implantable defibrillator (Medicalxpress.com) IRS rushes to fix error that sent millions of stimulus payments to wrong bank accounts (Michelle Singletary) Lack of Tiny Parts Disrupts Auto Factories Worldwide (NYTimes) Lost Passwords Lock Millionaires Out of Their Bitcoin Fortunes (NYTimes) Bug wipes UK arrest records (Tom Van Vleck) Risks of DNS encryption: NSA warns enterprises to beware of third-party DNS resolvers (Ars Technica) Company name could lead to security xss attack (IBTimes) How Amazon Sidewalk Works -- and Why You May Want to Turn It Off (WiReD) What to expect for the 2021 workplace (WashPost) In-Garage Delivery: Amazon Key (Amazon.com) AI algorithm over 70% accurate at guessing a person's political orientation (techxplore.com) Detection of Hardware Trojans Using Controlled Short-Term Aging (NYU Tandon School of Engineering) Unique study incorporates fluid dynamics and more to evaluate, enhance future implants (PHYS.ORG) Risk Management and Two-Dose Vaccines (Rob Slade) Different kinds of security (Rob Slade) Hacker Locks Internet-Connected Chastity Cage (Larry Werring) Re: Scope of Russian Hacking Far Exceeds Initial Fears (Larry Werring) Re: Voting Systems: The Cherry and the Cream (3daygoaty) Re: One Minute Left": Hockey, CoVID-19 ...vs hacking (Stephen Fierbaugh, Chris Drew, Stephen Fierbaugh) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2021 18:00:44 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Bursts of acceleration in Tesla vehicles caused by drivers mistaking accelerators for brakes, feds conclude (Ian Duncan) Ian Duncan, *The Washington Post*, 8 Jan 2021 Dozens of incidents involving Teslas unexpectedly accelerating and crashing were the fault of drivers, not a defect with the electric vehicles, the federal car safety agency concluded Friday. https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/01/08/tesla-brakes/ [Doesn't speak well of Tesla owners' driving skills...] ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 11:19:09 PST From: Peter Neumann <neumann () csl sri com> Subject: Riot in the Capitol is a nightmare scenario for cybersecurity professionals (Tonya Riley) Tonya Riley, *The Washington Post, 7 Jan 2021 Riot in the Capitol is a nightmare scenario for cybersecurity professionals Lawmakers and congressional staff were ushered into secure locations as a mob backing President Trump violently stormed the U.S. Capitol in hopes of overturning the election he lost. The assault -- which only temporarily delayed the certification of president-elect Joe Biden's win -- left many unanswered questions about security at the Capitol, including its cybersecurity. The quick evacuation left computers and other device unattended as the mob ransacked offices. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 00:23:17 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Post-Riot, the Capitol Hill IT Staff Faces a Security Mess (WiReD) Wednesday's insurrection could have exposed congressional data and devices in ways that have yet to be appreciated. [...] Given the scope of the intrusion, Coleman and others say that it's important to assume that any device could have been compromised and remediate the breach with that scale and scope in mind. But he and others emphasize that rather than replacing every device and cable in the entire congressional orbit, constant vigilance and an “assume breach” mentality will be the best defense going forward. The Economic Development Administration took an ill-advised maximalist approach after a 2011 compromise, launching a massive campaign <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/us-agency-baffled-by-modern-technology-destroys-mice-to-get-rid-of-viruses/> to physically destroy all of its digital equipment, including desktop computers, printers, cameras, mice, and keyboards -- most of which were uninfected. The effort concluded only when the agency ran out of money for the project. Congress needn't take an action so dramatic as that. But it also must acknowledge how exposed Wednesday's incident has left it. https://www.wired.com/story/capitol-riot-security-congress-trump-mob-clean-up/ Every cable? And if they ran out of money to destroy things, what was left to *buy* things? ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:35:30 -0700 From: "Bob Gezelter" <gezelter () rlgsc com> Subject: The Parler API was open without authentication. One or more third parties have done full downloads (Ars Technica) It is important to design APIs so that they are reasonably secure. It is reported that the Parler API was open (e.g. did not require authentication). Further more, the geo-tagging inherent in JPEG was provided on public images. Reportedly, the entire contents of Parler's database have been accessed by at least one third party. I guess that the individuals who implemented Parler were not well-read on web security issues, and were not familiar with the OWASP guidance on the subject. The full articles can be found at: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/01/parlers-amateur-coding-could-come-back-to-haunt-capitol-hill-rioters/ ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 18:08:42 PST From: Peter Neumann <neumann () csl sri com> Subject: ESS voting machine company sends threats (Andrew Appel) Andrew Appel <appel () princeton edu> has another RISKS-relevant article on freedom-to-tinker: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2021/01/11/ess-voting-machine-company-sends-threats/ ESS voting machine company sends threats, 11 Jan 2021 For over 15 years, election security experts and election integrity advocates have been communicating to their state and local election officials the dangers of touch-screen voting machines. The danger is simple: if fraudulent software is installed in the voting machine, it can steal votes in a way that a recount wouldn't be able to detect or correct. That was true of the paperless touchscreens of the 2000s, and it's still true of the ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and *all-in-one* machines such as the ES&S ExpressVote XL voting machine ( [ https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/bmd-insecure.pdf | see section 8 of this paper ] *). This analysis is based on the characteristics of the technology itself, and doesn't require any conspiracy theories about who owns the voting-machine company. In contrast, if an optical-scan voting machine was suspected to be hacked, the recount can assure an election outcome reflects the will of the voters, because the recount examines the very sheets of paper that the voters marked with a pen. In late 2020, many states were glad they used optical-scan voting machines with paper ballots: the recounts could demonstrate conclusively that the election results were legitimate, regardless of what software might have been installed in the voting machines or who owned the voting-machine companies. In fact, the vast majority of the states use optical-scan voting machines with hand-marked paper ballots, and in 2020 we saw clearly why that's a good thing. In November and December 2020, certain conspiracy theorists made unsupportable claims about the ownership of Dominion Voting Systems, which manufactured the voting machines used in Georgia. [ https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/dominion-voting-defamation-lawsuit/index.html Dominion has sued for defamation [For example, PGN suggests looking at this WashPost item: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dominion-sues-pro-trump-lawyer-sidney-powell-seeking-more-than-13-billion/2021/01/08/ebe5dbe0-5106-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html ] Dominion is the manufacturer of voting machines used in many states. Its rival, Election Systems and Software (ES&S), has an even bigger share of the market. Apparently, ES&S must think that amongst all that confusion, the time is right to send threatening Cease & Desist letters to the legitimate critics of their ExpressVote XL voting machine. Their lawyers sent [ https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2021-01-04-cease-and-desist-letter-to-smart-elections-0029787725-1/ | this letter ] to the leaders of [ https://smartelections.us/ | SMART Elections ] , a journalism+advocacy organization in New York State who have been communicating to the New York State Board of Elections, explaining to the Board why it's a bad idea to use the ExpressVote XL in New York (or in any state). ES&S's lawyers claim that certain facts (which they call *accusations*) are *false, defamatory, and disparaging*, namely: that the ``ExpressVote XL can add, delete, or change the votes on individual ballots'', that the ExpressVote XL will ``deteriorate our security and our ability to have confidence in our elections,'' and that it is a ``bad voting machine.'' Well, let me explain it for you. The ExpressVote XL, if hacked, can add, delete, or change votes on individual ballots -- and no voting machine is immune from hacking. That's why optical-scan voting machines are the way to go, because they can't change what's printed on the ballot. And let me explain some more: The ExpressVote XL, if adopted, will deteriorate our security and our ability to have confidence in our elections, and indeed it is a bad voting machine. And expensive, too! It's been clearly explained in the peer-reviewed literature how touch-screen voting machines -- even the ones like the XL that print out paper ballots -- can (if hacked) alter votes; and how most voters won't notice; and how even if some voters do notice, there's no way to correct the election result. And it's been explained why machines like the ExpressVote XL are particularly insecure -- as I said, [ https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/bmd-insecure.pdf | see section 8 of this paper ] *. And it's pretty clear that the folks at SMART Elections are aware of these scientific studies, and are basing their journalism and advocacy on good science. I'll summarize here what's explained in the paper: how the ExpressVote XL, if hacked, can change votes. If the machine is hacked, the software can do whatever the hacker has programmed, but the hacker can't change the hardware. The hardware includes a thermal printer that can make black marks (i.e., print text or barcodes or whatever) on the paper, but the hardware can't erase marks. Therefore you might think the ExpressVote XL, even if hacked, couldn't alter votes. But consider this: suppose there are 15 contests on the ballot; suppose the voter makes choices for all 13 contests and chooses not to vote for State Senator. Then what the legitimate software does is, in the line for State Senator, print NO SELECTION MADE. But the hacked software could simply leave that line blank -- then, when the voter has reviewed the ballot (or not bothered to), the ballot card is pulled past the printhead into the ballot box, and the printhead (under control of hacked software) can print in a vote for Candidate Smith. Few voters will be worried that the line is blank rather than filled in with NO SELECTION MADE. You might think, ``OK, the ExpressVote XL can fill in undervotes, that's bad, but it can't change votes.'' But it can! Here is the mechanism: Suppose the voter makes choices in all 15 contests, and chooses Jones for State Senator. The hacked software can print a ballot card with only 14 contests, and leave blank spaces for State Senator. Then, after the voter reviews the ballot card behind glass, the card moves past the printhead into the ballot box. At this time the hacked software can print the hacker's choice (Smith) for State Senator. If most humans were really good at checking their printout line-by-line with what they marked on the touchscreen, this wouldn't succeed because the voter would notice the missing line, but voters are only human. More details and explanation are in https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/bmd-insecure.pdf ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 10:04:05 +0800 From: Richard Stein <rmstein () ieee org> Subject: IPhone12 will stop your implantable defibrillator (Medicalxpress.com) https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-01-iphone12-implantable-defibrillator.html "In a recent paper in the journal Heart Rhythm, doctors describe how they turned off the potentially life-saving cardiac defibrillator function of an implanted Medtronic device simply by holding an iPhone 12 near it. The authors had nothing personal against Medtronic, or for that matter, against the new iPhone. The main reason they singled the phone out here was because it is compatible with some of the most advanced new technologies available for various magnetic-based communications and charging." [Monty Solomon noted another take: Medical study suggests iPhone 12 with MagSafe can deactivate pacemakers https://9to5mac.com/2021/01/11/iphone-12-magsafe-deactivates-pacemakers/ PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2021 18:02:51 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: IRS rushes to fix error that sent millions of stimulus payments to wrong bank accounts (Michelle Singletary) Michelle Singletary, *The Washington Post*, 8 Jan 2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/08/irs-tax-preparer-stimulus-error/ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 12:27:52 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Lack of Tiny Parts Disrupts Auto Factories Worldwide (NYTimes) Carmakers can't buy the semiconductors they need because home electronics are taking all the supply. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/business/auto-factories-semiconductor-chips.html [The Internet of Things is becoming the Internet of Ca-chings? PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 00:12:55 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Lost Passwords Lock Millionaires Out of Their Bitcoin Fortunes (NYTimes) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/technology/bitcoin-passwords-wallets-fortunes.html The risk? History repeating itself. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 03:20:47 -0800 From: Tom Van Vleck <thvv () multicians org> Subject: Bug wipes UK arrest records Software bug wipes out over 150,000 UK arrest records including fingerprints and DNA data. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 08:59:40 -0800 From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com> Subject: Risks of DNS encryption: NSA warns enterprises to beware of third-party DNS resolvers (Ars Technica) https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/01/the-nsa-warns-enterprises-to-beware-of-third-party-dns-resolvers/ ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 03:16:20 -0800 From: Tom Van Vleck <thvv () multicians org> Subject: Company name could lead to security xss attack Someone named his company " " > [or perhaps even `" " >'] https://www.ibtimes.sg/british-company-forced-change-name-it-could-be-used-cross-site-scripting-hack-53148 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 23:44:43 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: How Amazon Sidewalk Works -- and Why You May Want to Turn It Off (WiReD) The white paper points out the steps that Amazon has taken to make this as private and secure as possible, including a variety of cryptographic algorithms and those three levels of encryption: It shouldn't be possible for other people to spy on your network or suddenly gain access to your smart thermostat. Everything should happen seamlessly behind the scenes, in theory. All that said, it really comes down to how much you trust Amazon -- the company that seems keen to collect as much data as possible about you, shares Ring camera information with law enforcement agencies, and which hasn't always protected sensitive user data quite as robustly as it might have done. The company has also said it might share Sidewalk data with third-party developers further down the line, and you know where that kind of data sharing tends to lead. If you end up deciding that Amazon Sidewalk isn't for you, you need to take action: It's on by default, once the software update has hit your devices (it's also on by default for users setting up an Amazon-powered smart home for the first time.) If you want to turn it off, you need to open up the Alexa app on your phone, and go to More, Settings, Account Settings, and Amazon Sidewalk. https://www.wired.com/story/how-amazon-sidewalk-works/ ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 02:13:55 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: What to expect for the 2021 workplace (WashPost) Video chats will get smarter -- and, potentially, creepier -- thanks to artificial intelligence. If 2020 was the year video conferencing truly went mainstream, 2021 could be the year it gets smarter. Some of the largest platforms will begin using artificial intelligence to recognize and track certain gestures participants make, automate to-do items and help manage the challenges of workers split between work and home. Zoom Video Communications, for instance, announced a *smart gallery* feature it plans to roll out in June 2021 that will use cameras to make multiple people in the same on-site conference room appear as separate, equal-sized windows on their live-stream video. Those working from home will see the individual faces of each colleague rather than just a view of the whole conference room, an effort to visually shrink the differences between remote and in-person workers. ``We want to maintain the democratization of Zoom, and have everyone on the same level when people come back to the office,'' said Oded Gal, Zoom's chief product officer. Cisco Systems, meanwhile, will launch *gesture recognition* early next year using artificial intelligence to recognize specific movements -- clapping, raised hands, a thumbs up, or thumbs down. For large virtual meetings with hundreds of attendees, it could help gauge reactions to an idea without requiring attendees to answer a survey or click on-screen emoji. Asked if recognizing facial expressions like smiles, frowns or eye rolls in a video call might be next, Cisco Senior Vice President Jeetu Patel said addressing privacy concerns has to come first. Even collecting anonymous data might make people uneasy, he said. ``This is much more of a privacy and comfort issue than it is a technology issue. It's just a matter of what is going to be acceptable.'' Microsoft Teams, meanwhile, added a new feature late this year that uses AI to recognize what tasks participants agreed to complete during a meeting and send them reminders afterward, as well as create searchable meeting transcripts. ``It will follow up with me with *action items* that I agreed to,'' Jared Spataro, corporate vice president for Microsoft 365, said in an interview. ``A lot of things that people are thinking `Yeah, someday that will be reality' are actually already in the product.'' Microsoft has also filed a patent for a system that could use sensors, cameras and software to examine body language, expressions and participant contributions to come up with an *overall quality score* for how the meeting went. But Spataro said, ``Neither research nor patents is a good predictor of product pipeline. We're always looking at all those types of things.'' https://www.washingtonpost.com/road-to-recovery/2021/01/03/rtr-officetrends/ Potentially? ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 23:54:05 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: In-Garage Delivery: Amazon Key (Amazon.com) What is Key by Amazon In-Garage Delivery? Key by Amazon In-Garage Delivery is a secure, convenient way to receive Amazon packages inside your garage. It helps prevent package theft and provides protection from potentially damaging weather like heat and rain. Key by Amazon is also contactless, because there�s no interaction between you and the delivery associate, or contact between the associate and the garage door. Key In-Garage Delivery requires a compatible Smart Garage Hub or Wifi Garage Door Opener to enable authorized delivery associates to leave Amazon packages inside your garage. https://www.amazon.com/b?node=21222091011&ref=kfg_surl_key ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 10:53:57 +0800 From: Richard Stein <rmstein () ieee org> Subject: AI algorithm over 70% accurate at guessing a person's political orientation (techxplore.com) https://techxplore.com/news/2021-01-ai-algorithm-accurate-person-political.html "A team of researchers at Stanford University has developed an AI algorithm that proved to be slightly over 70% accurate at guessing a person's political affiliation after studying a single photograph. In their paper published in the journal Scientific Reports, the group describes building and testing their algorithm and how well it worked." See "Facial recognition technology can expose political orientation from naturalistic facial images," for a detailed discussion of image classification and algorithm operation. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-79310-1 "The researchers were not able to pin down exactly what sorts of facial characteristics their system correlated with political affiliation, but they did find some trends -- head orientation and emotional expression, for example, appeared to provide some clues." Political profiling based on facial recognition can guide campaign advertising, appeals for donations, personnel recruiting, etc. Given a polarized electorate, the algorithm might assist identification of persuadable voters to tip a close election. Correlate this algorithm's predictive capabilities with an interpretation of the brain's amygdala, as explored by political neuroscientists [1] using fMRI to estimate political inclinations, to yield artificially intelligent phrenology. [1] "A Neurology of the Conservative-Liberal Dimension of Political Ideology, Part 4: Neuroimaging Studies" from https://neuro.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.16030051 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 13:57:46 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Detection of Hardware Trojans Using Controlled Short-Term Aging (NYU Tandon School of Engineering) The project builds upon on-going research, funded by a $1.3 million grant from the Office of Naval Research, to create algorithms for detecting Trojans -- deliberate flaws inserted into chips during fabrication -- based on the short term aging phenomena in transistors. It will focus on this physical phenomenon of short-term aging as a route to detecting hardware Trojans. The efficacy of short-term aging-based hardware Trojan detection has been demonstrated through simulations on integrated circuits (ICs) with several types of hardware Trojans through stochastic perturbations injected into the simulation studies. This DURIP project seeks to demonstrate hardware Trojan detection in actual physical ICs. https://engineering.nyu.edu/news/detection-hardware-trojans-using-controlled-short-term-aging ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 11:15:50 +0800 From: Richard Stein <rmstein () ieee org> Subject: Unique study incorporates fluid dynamics and more to evaluate, enhance future implants (PHYS.ORG) https://phys.org/news/2021-01-unique-incorporates-fluid-dynamics-future.html "Rice University engineers hope to make life better for those with replacement joints by modeling how artificial hips are likely to rub them the wrong way." Knee, hip, and shoulder replacements are performed routinely, especially for an aging population. Arthroplasty is the medical procedure orthopedic surgeons apply for joint replacement. "Rates of Total Joint Replacement in the United States: Future Projections to 2020--2040 Using the National Inpatient Sample" https://www.jrheum.org/content/early/2019/04/09/jrheum.170990 estimates 498K total hip arthroplasty and 1.06M total knee arthroplasty procedures in 2020 within the US. The essay projects a 2-3X multiplier for each by 2040. The FDA's product classification website (type in 'knee' or 'hip' to see an extended list) (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/PCDSimpleSearch.cfm, A culled list (filtered for implants -- partial and total -- and inspected to possess non-null TPLC medical device report records) reveals 24 separate product codes for hip replacements and 20 for knee replacements. Each product code represents manufactured devices consisting of various plastics, metals, or a combination of these materials. Given the product code count above, and the Patient Problem counts given below, an estimate of diminished quality of life from hip arthroplasty can be calculated assuming there's at least 1 manufactured product per product code. 1085 * 24 = 47740 patient problems/5 years = 9548 patient problems per year or 9,548/498,000 = ~2% of all arthroplasty procedures in 2020 are estimated to experience post-operative negative quality of life impact: infection, pain, dislocations, etc. A similar method can be applied to estimate knee replacement quality of life impacts. Given the implantation growth rate projection, this number is likely to double or triple by 2040 without significant improvements in prosthetic device and patient arthroplasty treatment life cycles. For product code JDH (Device: prosthesis, hip, hemi-, trunnion-bearing, femoral, metal/polyacetal, Regulation Description: Hip joint femoral (hemi-hip) trunnion-bearing metal/polyacetal cemented prosthesis), the FDA's Total Product Life Cycle tool (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTPLC/tplc.cfm?id=4638) aggregates the following Top-10 Device Problems and Patient Problems (linked to medical device reports) between 01JAN2016 and 31DEC2020 (in CSV format): Device Problems,MDRs with this Device Problem,Events in those MDRs Insufficient Information,387,387 Adverse Event Without Identified Device or Use Problem,177,177 Device Dislodged or Dislocated,121,121 Break,71,71 Fracture,65,65 Loose or Intermittent Connection,36,36 Appropriate Term/Code Not Available,31,31 Unintended Movement,22,22 Unstable,14,14 Loosening of Implant Not Related to Bone-Ingrowth,12,12 Migration or Expulsion of Device,10,10 The Top-10 Patient Problems attributed to this product code in CSV format are: Patient Problems,MDRs with this Patient Problem,Events in those MDRs Injury,532,532 Unspecified Infection,125,125 Pain,88,88 Joint Dislocation,78,78 No Code Available,60,60 No Information,50,50 Bone Fracture(s),50,50 No Known Impact Or Consequence To Patient,40,40 No Consequences Or Impact To Patient,32,32 Failure of Implant,30,30 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 12:15:56 -0800 From: Rob Slade <rmslade () shaw ca> Subject: Risk Management and Two-Dose Vaccines Now that vaccines have started to roll out, we have a new risk management lesson from them. Most of the vaccines that have been approved so far are two-dose vaccines. With the rush to get vaccines into people in the most expeditious manner, there is now a new controversy. Do you give as many people as possible one dose of the vaccine, or do you hold back doses so that there will be a guaranteed supply for those who need a second shot? First, let's look at the mechanics of what is going on with the two-dose vaccines. (There are some one dose vaccines coming, but they seem to be at least a month away from approval, so we've got some time to discuss this.) The first shot, in a two-dose series, is often referred to as a primer shot. It is delivering some material to the body to alert the immune system to something it should be paying attention to. Most often this is some kind of protein that is foreign to the human body. The Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are kind of interesting in that they contain messenger RNA (mRNA) that makes our bodies produce the protein spikes that are on the coronavirus. Having produced these proteins (without ever having encountered the actual virus), our bodies then produce antibodies that identify and attack these proteins. The idea is that, by the time we actually encounter some coronavirus, our bodies are primed and ready to attack the actual virus. (Given the trials that have gone on, and the data collected, the idea seems to be correct.) With many two-dose vaccines, the second dose, sometimes known as a booster shot, as opposed to the initial primer shot, is often just more of the same. (Both the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are of this type.) In past studies of vaccines, it seems to be that, in the case of many vaccines, a second shot of the same material does two things. The first is that it increases the protective effectiveness of the vaccine, by boosting the immune response that we produce. The second is that it increases the duration over time that the body is able to produce this response, thus conferring protection over a longer period. For example, after a single shot the body may produce an effective immune response for a period of four months. After a second shot, that might be increased to two years. (At this point we don't have good data about duration in regard to the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, since they haven't existed for more than a few months, but we assume they will follow a similar pattern.) The increase in duration is, of course, a benefit. But, in the midst of a pandemic, and particularly in the midst of huge second and third wave surges, it is the increase in effectiveness that sets up the possible controversy. Do you leave some people only partly protected, so that you can partly protect others? Since this is risk management, we again have to note probabilities and uncertainties and the fact that none of this is quantum. Protection isn't absolute, and it doesn't turn on and off. In particular, protection doesn't turn on instantly, and takes time to develop. And it also takes time to go away again. In a two-dose vaccine regime, you receive an initial primer shot. That does not mean you can now safely go to bars and insurrection mobs without being at risk of getting CoVID-19. It will take some time for your body to develop any kind of immune response. After three weeks or so, you may have about 80% protection. Note that this isn't 100% protection. You can still get infected if you encounter someone who is infectious. But you are less likely to become infected. (Actually, even though it might sound low, 80% is pretty good for a vaccine. The flu vaccines that we get every year are only about 50% effective. That, and the effects of herd immunity when almost everyone gets the vaccine, means far fewer cases of the flu, and fewer deaths, and less time lost to sickness, and less impact on the economy, and so even a 50% effective vaccine is a very good thing.) At this point, two things may be happening. Your body may (and probably is) still increasing it�s protection, even without any further intervention. Some of the Pfizer and Moderna data indicates that, over a longer period of time, even a single dose of the vaccine can confer protection over 90%. But you can, at this point, get the second, booster, dose of the vaccine. Following the booster dose, after some time (possibly a week, possibly six weeks), your protection level can rise to around 95%. A couple more points to note. I said �at this point.� Vaccine studies in the past have clearly shown that, if you give the booster shot too early, it is basically a waste of vaccine. There is a minimum time, after the primer shot, before a booster shot gives any booster effect. This minimum time seems to be three weeks, in the case of Pfizer, and four weeks, in the case of Moderna. Another factor to consider is that, while there is a definite minimum time period between shots in terms of maximum effect, the maximum time between shots is much more open ended. If the minimum time is three weeks, then there is no diminution of effect if you wait until four weeks to give the booster. In fact, many studies seem to indicate that, to a certain extent, the longer you wait for the second, booster, shot, the stronger the protection and the longer the duration of protection. (Again, the coronavirus vaccines simply haven't been in existence long enough for us to have really good data on the timing, but studies or existing vaccines show that this is very likely.) Yet another consideration goes back to those numbers. You will recall that I said 80% was pretty good protection. It is. 90% is better, and 95% is better still. But even 95% isn't that much better than 80%, and 80% is a whole lot better than nothing. So, back to the controversy. When we start giving vaccines, we can stick with the minimum time regime, and give everyone a second dose as soon as they hit the three week mark. That way we get more people up to 95% protection sooner. Or, we can delay the second dose out to five weeks. The downside is that those people spend an extra two weeks at 80% protection before they get the booster dose. But, during those two weeks, we can start bringing even more people to 80% protection (rather than leaving them with nothing). Which means we start building herd immunity faster. And the early lot are not, after all, being left with no protection. They are probably at 80%, and may be building, themselves, towards 90%. And they are still well within the time period during which they are going to get the booster effect. They may even get a better booster effect for the delay. The calculus involved here is complex. It involves the infectiousness of the virus, the effectiveness of the vaccine, the total numbers of cases, and a number of other considerations. However, in our situation, the answer seems to fall on the *delay* side of the equation. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 11:35:30 -0800 From: Rob Slade <rmslade () shaw ca> Subject: Different kinds of security For years, no, actually decades, I have read, with pleasure and reliance, a certain columnist's columns on politics in BC. He has been knowledgeable, analytical, and educational. Due to his taking on a field outside his expertise in 2020, that of the pandemic, I am rapidly losing any and all of the respect that I ever had for his journalistic abilities. https://vancouversun.com/opinion/columnists/vaughn-palmer-dix-ducks-and- covers-before-fessing-up-on-care-home-covid-outbreaks His latest column chides Health Minister Adrian Dix for being careful in his answer about a question involving the rise of infections in long term care homes. Yes, Dix might have answered earlier and more directly that staff is responsible for most outbreaks in long term care. But that is a loaded question right now. Staff are responsible for outbreaks because they are the ones moving between the community and the homes. What do you want to do about that? Ban the staff? Leave the homes unattended, and let the residents shift as best they can from their beds? But the columnist isn't content to raise that nonsensical issue. He then goes on to blame the "second wave" surge on the election. Anyone who takes the time to look at the case numbers can see that the election made almost no contribution to the surge, which clearly dates from Thanksgiving dinners and parties. The columnist then takes up the cudgel on behalf of the idea of "routine" testing for staff. As he has been told many times when he raises the (same) question on "The Dr. Bonnie Show (co-starring Adrian Dix and Nigel Howard)," there *is* routine testing of medical staff. It's just that the routine varies depending upon the level of medical and public health risk, and not at the call of some political columnist. Testing of every staff member twice a week would still leave at least a four day window every week during which people could become infected and infectious. In fact the window would be longer, since test results take about 24 to 48 hours to be processed. And who is it that would do these tests (by the way, how many LTC staff are there in the entire province of BC?), and what work would *not* be done while they are doing them? Risk management is obviously not the columnist's field. It may just be CoVID fatigue and increased irritability on my part, but I am growing distressed with the poor quality of the Sun's coverage of the pandemic, and it's seeming pursuit of the scandalous over the informative. And so I fired off this rant to some of my friends in security. And got a response back:
Did you send this to the wrong mailing list?
So, I definitely did not make the point I wanted to make properly. I suppose a bit more detail (and a bit less rant) is in order. Lemme start with a seminar I did some time back. Unusually, it was actually in Vancouver. I had two candidates, sitting next to each other, as it happened, who both worked for government, but came from radically divergent security situations, as became obvious when we discussed the good old CIA triad of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. One worked for E-Comm. These are the people who, among other things, answer the phones when you call 911. The E-Comm people don't exactly broadcast their calls, but confidentiality is not their first concern. That's availability. When somebody in trouble calls 911, somebody *has* to answer the phone. (I had a tour through E-Comm one time, and their business continuity and resilience planning is *really* impressive.) Sitting beside him was a candidate from one of the business development banks of the federal government. These agencies provide loans to businesses that want to expand their business. Since the idea is expansion, most of the loans aren't exactly secured by traditional equity. In order to ensure that the money (mostly) goes to actually building business, the companies have to provide masses of information about themselves, their markets, and their plans. This data is *highly* confidential: if it ever got into the hands of their competitors, the companies could be in real trouble. So everything is kept strictly confidential, and almost all their security is directed that way. But availability? As he said himself, "Hey, we're the federal government. If we disappeared for a month, who would even notice?" I guess what the columnist doesn't see (and what I didn't really allow for), is that he has worked for decades in politics. Politics is definitely a long game. It doesn't really happen all that fast. It's important to have a really good memory, going back decades. You need to analyse. And you've got all the time in the world to analyse, because nothing is going to happen very quickly. You need to look, in minute detail, at what the government, and political figures, are doing, while they are doing it, to point out minor flaws so that, by the time an act *is* passed, it's perfect. (It never actually *is* perfect, but that's what you are aiming for.) But a pandemic isn't politics, even though a lot of political work is involved. A pandemic is emergency management. You have to do *something*, because, if you don't, people will die. And, often, anything you do is better than doing nothing, because if you do nothing, people will die. So, delaying things while you look for a perfect solution is wrong, because, in emergency management, "the best" is very definitely the enemy of the good. Pandemics are fluid, and you make the best choice you can, at the time, with limited information, and change plans when the information changes, and hope, rather desperately, that the first plans you made don't run completely counter to later information. But you make a choice, and do it, because, if you don't, people will die. In emergency management, you do try to get divergent opinions, to try and make sure that you don't make a drastic mistake. But the very last thing you need, in the middle of a pandemic or other disaster, is someone publicly second-guessing what you are doing. That can wait for the "after action" debriefings. During the crisis, having some political columnist (with no training in emergency management, or even risk management) saying that you are making a mistake is just messing with the messaging you are trying to get out to the public. And, if that happens, people might die. There are different types of security. They are useful in different types of situations. There is no "one size fits all." We need to apply the right security to the right situation. And we definitely don't want to apply the wrong security to the wrong situation. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:12:54 -0500 From: Larry Werring <lwerring () nrtco net> Subject: Hacker Locks Internet-Connected Chastity Cage The risks seem obvious...<br> https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7apnn/your-cock-is-mine-now-hacker-locks-internet-connected-chastity-cage-demands-ransom ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 21:39:04 -0500 From: Larry Werring <lwerring () nrtco net> Subject: Re: Scope of Russian Hacking Far Exceeds Initial Fears (RISKS-32.44) I am getting very tired of reading stories like this. I worked IT security for many years in Government (now retired) expending much effort to stop this kind of activity. One of the reasons I retired early was the lack of will to really do anything about this type of activity. If the Russians or the Chinese or anyone else, for that matter, flew over and dropped troops into our major centers with orders to break into key Government and commercial buildings, sabotage critical infrastructure, and steal sensitive information and other valuables, we would immediately retaliate in an appropriate manner that would discourage future similar activities. Doing it electronically is the same as doing it the old fashioned way (analog). Why isn't anyone dealing with it as such? As far as I know, there has been no retaliation for the numerous intrusions that have occurred over the years. Why are we still letting them get away with it? Unless we treat this like an electronic war and appropriately defend ourselves with a good offence, they will keep doing it with impunity. If you are going to do nothing then you might as well throw open the doors and let them in (i.e. surrender). At the very least, take control of or destroy their access to the Internet so they can't access their targets.<br> <br> Maybe it's a good thing that I am retired. My frustration and bitterness at doing so much over the years with so little effect is beginning to show through. I can see from this and other similar posts that my peers are having very little success in dealing with the many crooks and enemies conducting these intrusions. Were I still working, I would be even more frustrated than I am reading about it. Continue to do nothing and they'll reap your reward. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 14:26:08 +1100 From: 3daygoaty <threedaygoaty () gmail com> Subject: Re: Voting Systems: The Cherry and the Cream (RISKS-32.44)
At anytime after I'd voted, I could check my vote online by entering my registration number.
I ran one of these pilots in 2007, the one in Swindon. It is illegal for the voting authority to issue any kind of binding proof of your vote that you could use to trade, sell or demonstrate your voting choices to a third party. The challenge is to show you something convincing that is not your vote, but which also can be independently verified. One of the best that has been achieved to date and not torn to shreds (so to speak) -- for which I was the project manager -- is vVote (2014) due to Teague, Schneider, Culnane, Hook and Ryan, and this is a supervised polling place system based on Pret a Voter. I am not aware of a remote votingscheme in the world used or proposed for high stakes public elections that has withstood even a fairly brief spotlight by the voting security community. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 07:31:33 -0600 From: Stephen Fierbaugh <stephen () fierbaugh org> Subject: Re: One Minute Left": Hockey, CoVID-19 ...vs hacking (Drewe, RISKS-32.43) We "wait" until total monthly deaths from all causes decrease to <= 1 standard deviation from normal. The benefit is this calculation is easy to make from readily available civil data collection processes which have been in place for a long time, doesn't require any special testing, and can't really be manipulated. For my Smith County, Texas, USA, mortality is currently at 7.351 standard deviations. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 22:24:07 +0000 From: "Chris D." <e767pmk () yahoo co uk> Subject: Re: One Minute Left": Hockey, CoVID-19 ...vs hacking (Fierbaugh, RISKS-32.45) Thanks, but I'm not sure if it's that simple. Reportedly, what panics politicians is people dying from Covid-19 in hospital corridors or parking lots, so much routine health treatment has virtually stopped to leave room for these people. "Total monthly deaths from all causes" will include those who may have died from delayed investigation and/or treatment but it's difficult to say how many there were, and people who die quietly at home aren't so conspicuous. We are deluged with figures on daily/weekly/monthly deaths, but often measured in different ways or time periods, and then there's the annual panic over 'winter'. There are constant demands over making lockdown restrictions stricter, or if this would make things better or worse... Hope that helped but it probably didn't. CD ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 16:46:55 -0600 From: Stephen Fierbaugh <stephen () fierbaugh org> Subject: Re: One Minute Left": Hockey, CoVID-19 ...vs hacking (Drewe, RISKS-32.45) Clarification: I didn't mean that we stay locked down until then. Rather, the public health emergency will be over then. That the metric measures all deaths, not just explicitly COVID-19 is an intentional feature, not a bug. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2020 11:11:11 -0800 From: RISKS-request () csl sri com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: The mailman Web interface can be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe: http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks => SUBMISSIONS: to risks () CSL sri com with meaningful SUBJECT: line that includes the string `notsp'. Otherwise your message may not be read. *** This attention-string has never changed, but might if spammers use it. => SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative address from which you never send mail where the address becomes public! => The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, etc.) is online. <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html> *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines! => OFFICIAL ARCHIVES: http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's searchable html archive at newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS --> VoLume, ISsue. Also, ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for the current volume/previous directories or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks-VL.IS for previous VoLume If none of those work for you, the most recent issue is always at http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt, and index at /risks-32.00 ALTERNATIVE ARCHIVES: http://seclists.org/risks/ (only since mid-2001) *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads. Apologies for what Office365 and SafeLinks may have done to URLs. ==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum: <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1> ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 32.45 ************************ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit precedence: bulk Subject: Risks Digest 32.46 RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 25 January 2021 Volume 32 : Issue 46 ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/32.46> The current issue can also be found at <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt> Contents: FAA Files Reveal a Surprising Threat to Airline Safety: the U.S. Military's GPS Tests (IEEE Spectrum) Australia's proposed media code could break the world wide web, says the man who invented it (The Guardian) Big Tech (Lauren Weinstein) Home alarm tech admits he used security cameras to be a serial Peeping Tom (ProTip via Ars Technica) AI-powered text from this program could fool the government (Will Knight) No stopping AI? Scientists conclude there would be no way to control super-intelligent machines (Study Finds) DNSpooq Lets Attackers Poison DNS Cache Records (Catalin Cimpanu) 1,900 doses of Moderna vaccine destroyed after cleaner accidentally unplugs freezer in Boston (ABC News) COVID-19 Vaccine Reservations (RLGSC via Bob Gezelter) Intelligence Analysts Use U.S. Smartphone Location Data Without Warrants (NYTimes) A Lesson From 1930s Germany: Beware State Control of Social Media (Heidi Tworek via Kimi Wei) Biden Has a Peloton Bike. That Raises Issues at the White House. (NYTimes) Biden will be the first president to use the new Air Force One (Business Insider) Janet Yellen suggests 'curtailing' cryptocurrency (Business Insider) Camouflage shield known as Quantum Stealth, is light-bending material that could be used to obscure objects of varying sizes (Geoff Goodfellow) Google-Linked Balloon Project to Provide Cell Service Will Close (NYTimes) Supermarket Worker Stole $1 Million and Bought Cars and Guns, Police Say (NYTimes) Forever Chemicals Are Widespread in U.S. Drinking Water (Scientific American) Revving up electric car industry, Israeli firm develops 5-minute-charge battery (The Guardian) Re: Bursts of acceleration in Tesla vehicles caused by drivers mistaking accelerators for brakes ... (Don Norman with appended excerpts from John Levine and Michael Bacon) Re: Post-Riot, the Capitol Hill IT Staff Faces a Security Mess (Craig S. Cottingham) Re: Bug wipes UK arrest records (Michael Bacon, John Colville) Re: Company name could lead to security xss attack (Wol) Re: Risk Management and Two-Dose Vaccines (Rob Slade) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 09:57:56 -1000 From: geoff goodfellow <geoff () iconia com> Subject: FAA Files Reveal a Surprising Threat to Airline Safety: the U.S. Military's GPS Tests (IEEE Spectrum) *Military tests that jam and spoof GPS signals are an accident waiting to happen* Early one morning last May, a commercial airliner was approaching El Paso International Airport, in West Texas, when a warning popped up in the cockpit: *GPS Position Lost*. The pilot contacted the airline's operations center and received a report that the U.S. Army's White Sands Missile Range <https://www.wsmr.army.mil/Pages/home.aspx>, in South Central New Mexico, was disrupting the GPS signal. ``We knew then that it was not an aircraft GPS fault,'' the pilot wrote later. The pilot missed an approach on one runway due to high winds, then came around to try again. ``We were forced to Runway 04 with a predawn landing with no access to [an instrument landing] with vertical guidance,'' the pilot wrote. ``Runway 04 has a high CFIT threat due to the climbing terrain in the local area.'' CFIT stands for ``controlled flight into terrain,'' and it is exactly as serious as it sounds. The pilot considered diverting to Albuquerque, 370 kilometers away, but eventually bit the bullet and tackled Runway 04 using only visual aids. The plane made it safely to the ground, but the pilot later logged the experience on NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System <https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/>, a forum where pilots can anonymously share near misses and safety tips. This is far from the most worrying ASRS report involving GPS jamming. In August 2018, a passenger aircraft in Idaho, flying in smoky conditions, reportedly suffered GPS interference from military tests and was saved from crashing into a mountain only by the last-minute intervention of an air traffic controller. ``Loss of life can happen because air traffic control and a flight crew believe their equipment are working as intended, but are in fact leading them into the side of the mountain,'' wrote the controller. ``Had [we] not noticed, that flight crew and the passengers would be dead. I have no doubt.''. [...] https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/faa-files-reveal-a-surprising-threat-to-airline-safety-the-us-militarys-gps-tests [For further background on this topic, see Kate Murphy, Our GPS System Is Too Vulnerable, *The New York Times* Sunday Review, 24 Jan 2021. ``We need a backup for a service that is essential but full of weaknesses.'' Sounds quite consistent with other RISKS items! PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 20:07:09 -0800 From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com> Subject: Australia's proposed media code could break the world wide web, says the man who invented it (The Guardian) https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/20/australias-proposed-media-code-could-break-the-world-wide-web-says-the-man-who-invented-it ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 14:23:51 -0800 From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com> Subject: Big Tech [via NNSquad] Some of my contemporaries are jumping on the "Big Tech is the Enemy" bandwagon. I could not disagree more. I am convinced that "Big Tech" is ultimately our salvation -- and that does include social media. The goal must be fixing the problems we have created, not killing Big Tech. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:57:57 -0800 From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com> Subject: Home alarm tech admits he used security cameras to be a serial Peeping Tom (ProTip via Ars Technica) No cameras in the bedroom? https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/01/home-alarm-tech-backdoored-security-cameras-to-spy-on-customers-having-sex/ ------------------------------ Date: January 18, 2021 at 7:38:27 PM GMT+9 From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com> Subject: AI-powered text from this program could fool the government (Will Knight) [via Dave Farber] Volunteers couldn't tell AI-generated comments from those penned by humans. Will Knight, Ars Technica, 17 Jan 2021 https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/01/ai-powered-text-from-this-program-could-fool-the-government/ In October 2019, Idaho proposed changing its Medicaid program. The state needed approval from the federal government, which solicited public feedback via Medicaid.gov. Roughly 1,000 comments arrived. But half came not from concerned citizens or even Internet trolls. They were generated by artificial intelligence. And a study found that people could not distinguish the real comments from the fake ones. The project was the work of Max Weiss, a tech-savvy medical student at Harvard, but it received little attention at the time. Now, with AI language systems advancing rapidly, some say the government and Internet companies need to rethink how they solicit and screen feedback to guard against deepfaketext manipulation and other AI-powered interference. ``The ease with which a bot can generate and submit relevant text that impersonates human speech on government websites is surprising and really important to know,'' says Latanya Sweeney, a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School who advised Weiss on how to run the experiment ethically. Sweeney says the problems extend well beyond government services, but it is imperative that public agencies find a solution. ``AI can drown speech from real humans,'' she says. ``Government websites have to change.'' The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services says it has added new safeguards to the public comment system in response to Weiss's study, though it declines to discuss specifics. Weiss says he was contacted by the US General Services Administration, which is developing a new version of the federal government website for publishing regulations and comments, about ways to better protect it from fake comments. Government systems have been the target of automated influence campaigns before. In 2017, researchers discovered that over a million comments submitted to the Federal Communications Commission regarding plans to roll back net neutrality rules had been auto-generated, with certain phrases copied and pasted into different messages. Weiss's project highlights a more serious threat. There has been remarkable progress in applying AI to language over the past few years. When powerful machine-learning algorithms are fed huge amounts of training data=94in the form of books and text scraped from the Web=94they can produce programs capable of generating convincing text. Besides myriad useful applications, this raises the prospect that all sorts of Internet messages, comments, and posts could be faked easily and less detectably. ``As technology gets better,'' Sweeney says, ``human speech venues become subject to manipulation without human knowledge that it has happened.'' Weiss was working at a health care consumer-advocacy organization in the summer of 2019 when he learned about the public feedback process required to make Medicaid changes. Knowing that these public comments had swayed previous efforts to change state Medicaid programs, Weiss looked for tools that could auto-generate comments. ``I was a bit shocked when I saw nothing more than a submit button standing in the way of your comment becoming a part of the public record,'' he says. Weiss discovered GPT-2, a program released earlier that year by OpenAI, an AI company in San Francisco, and realized he could generate fake comments to simulate a groundswell of public opinion. ``I was also shocked at how easy it was to fine tune GPT-2 to actually spit out the comments,'' Weiss says. ``It's relatively concerning on a number of fronts.'' Besides the comment-generating tool, Weiss built software for automatically submitting comments. He also conducted an experiment in which volunteers were asked to distinguish between the AI-generated comments and ones written by humans. The volunteers did no better than random guessing. After submitting the comments, Weiss notified the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. He had added a few characters to make it easy to identify each fake comment. Even so, he says, the AI feedback remained posted online for several months. GPT-3 OpenAI released a more capable version of its text-generation program, called GPT-3, last June. So far, it has only been made available to a few AI researchers and companies, with some people building useful applications such as programs that generate email messages from bullet points. When GPT-3 was released, OpenAI said in a research paper that it had not seen signs of GPT-2 being used maliciously, even though it had been aware of Weiss's research. OpenAI and other researchers have released a few tools capable of identifying AI-generated text. These use similar AI algorithms to spot telltale signs in the text. It's not clear if anyone is using these to protect online commenting platforms. Facebook declined to say if it is using such tools; Google and Twitter did not respond to requests for comment. It also isn't clear if sophisticated AI tools are yet being used to create fake content. In August, researchers at Google posted details of an experiment that used deepfake-text-detection tools to analyze over 500 million webpages. They found that the tools could identify pages hosting auto-generated text and spam. But it wasn't clear if any of the content was made using an AI tool such as GPT-2. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 12:28:06 -1000 From: geoff goodfellow <geoff () iconia com> Subject: No stopping AI? Scientists conclude there would be no way to control super-intelligent machines (Study Finds)
From self-driving cars to computers that can win game shows, humans have a
natural curiosity and interest in artificial intelligence (AI). As scientists continue making machines smarter and smarter however, some are asking ``what happens when computers get too smart for their own good?''
From The Matrix to The Terminator, the entertainment industry has already
started pondering if future robots will one day threaten the human race. Now, a new study concludes there may be no way to stop the rise of machines. An international team says humans would not be able to prevent super artificial intelligence from doing whatever it wanted to. Scientists from the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute have started to picture what such a machine would look like. Imagine an AI program with an intelligence far superior to humans. So much so that it could learn on its own without new programming. If it was connected to the Internet, researchers say the AI would have access to all of humanity's data and could even take control of other machines around the globe. Study authors ask what would such an intelligence <https://www.studyfinds.org/human-brains-computer-see-objects/> do with all that power? Would it work to make all of our lives better? Would it devote its processing power to fixing issues like climate change? Or, would the machine look to take over the lives <https://www.studyfinds.org/majority-of-office-workers-feel-artificial-intelligence-could-replace-them-within-5-years/> of its human neighbors? Controlling the uncontrollable? The dangers of super artificial intelligence [...] https://www.studyfinds.org/no-way-to-control-super-artificial-intelligence-ai/ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 12:18:06 -0500 (EST) From: ACM TechNews <technews-editor () acm org> Subject: DNSpooq Lets Attackers Poison DNS Cache Records (Catalin Cimpanu) Catalin Cimpanu, ZDNet, 19 Jan 2021 via ACM TechNews, 25 Jan 2021 Researchers in Israeli boutique cybersecurity consultancy JSOF have disclosed seven vulnerabilities that affect Dnsmasq, a domain name system (DNS) forwarding client for *NIX-based operating systems. The vulnerabilities involve DNSpooq software in millions of devices sold worldwide, including networking gear like routers, access points, firewalls, and VPNs from numerous companies. The researchers say the vulnerabilities could be combined to poison DNS cache entries recorded by Dnsmasq servers, allowing attackers to redirect users to clones of legitimate websites. Four of the vulnerabilities are buffer overflows in the Dnsmasq code that could result in remote code execution scenarios, and the remainder enable DNS cache poisoning. The researchers advise users to apply security updates released by the Dnsmasq project. https://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_6-291b8x2279e7x070793& ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 14:10:41 -0600 From: "Allen M. Bonneau" Subject: 1,900 doses of Moderna vaccine destroyed after cleaner accidentally unplugs freezer in Boston (ABC News) I have seen many stories about cleaners unplugging various systems so they could plug in the vacuum cleaner, etc.� This is the first one I have seen where the system was alarmed for this very scenario. Toto said, the freezer at the Boston pharmacy "was in a secure location and had an alarm system installed.�The plug was found loose after a contractor accidentally removed it while cleaning." He said they are investigating why the incident occurred and why the alarm system did not work as it was supposed to. https://abcnews.go.com/Health/1900-doses-moderna-vaccine-destroyed-cleaner-accidentally-unplugs/story?id=75419665 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 04:57:59 -0700 From: "Bob Gezelter" <gezelter () rlgsc com> Subject: COVID-19 Vaccine Reservations (RLGSC) Various new outlets have reported systemic problems with the COVID-19 vaccination program in the United States. The most recent installment in my blog, Ruminations, discussed some of the major issues I encountered. The general public is rarely impacted by poor choices in IT implementations. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 vaccination program has become an example of how not to implement important public-facing computer systems. ... The full text can be found at: http://www.rlgsc.com/blog/ruminations/public-health-endangered-by-deficient-user-models.html ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 15:27:37 -0500 From: Jan Wolitzky <jan.wolitzky () gmail com> Subject: Intelligence Analysts Use U.S. Smartphone Location Data Without Warrants, Memo Says https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/us/politics/dia-surveillance-data.html ------------------------------ Date: January 19, 2021 at 10:13:21 AM GMT+9 From: Kimi Wei <kimiwei88 () gmail com> Subject: A Lesson From 1930s Germany: Beware State Control of Social Media Heidi Tworek, *The Atlantic*, 26 May 2019 [via Dave Farber] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/germany-war-radio-social-media/590149/?fbclid=IwAR1o7hi3wl70oEtokq9Q4ofduG45sSF-4XqAb6tXfS7lUKnPjZeglRRg0H0 Regulators should think carefully about the fallout from well-intentioned new rules and avoid the mistakes of the past ``Our way of taking power and using it would have been inconceivable without the radio and the airplane,'' Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels claimed in August 1933. [Timely byt very long item truncated for RISKS. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 05:33:22 -0500 From: Jan Wolitzky <jan.wolitzky () gmail com> Subject: Biden Has a Peloton Bike. That Raises Issues at the White House. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/biden-peloton.html ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 13:38:57 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Biden will be the first president to use the new Air Force One (Business Insider) Here's what we know about the $5.3-billion aircraft https://www.businessinsider.com/what-we-know-about-the-air-force-one-replacement-project-2020-7 Favorite line: The Air Force announced in April that Boeing will develop the owner's manual for the new VC-25B aircraft and the service branch is paying $84 million for it, DefenseOne reported. The manual will reportedly contain over 100,000 pages and won't even be ready at the time of the jet's estimated delivery to the Air Force, with DefenseOne reporting that it will arrive in January 2025. That is one serious manual! And it better have a quick index for pilots... ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:03:49 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Janet Yellen suggests 'curtailing' cryptocurrency https://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/news/bitcoin-price-cryptocurrency-should-be-curtailed-terrorism-concerns-yellen-2021-1-1029985692 On the other hand... http://broadbandbreakfast.com/2021/01/panelists-at-ces-2021-agree-widespread-adoption-of-cryptocurrency-is-imminent/ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 10:00:08 -1000 From: geoff goodfellow <geoff () iconia com> Subject: Camouflage shield known as Quantum Stealth, is light-bending material that could be used to obscure objects of varying sizes https://twitter.com/knowIedgehub/status/1352235869143330819 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 13:00:14 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Google-Linked Balloon Project to Provide Cell Service Will Close (NYTimes) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/technology/loon-google-balloons.html ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 13:11:00 -0500 From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe () gabegold com> Subject: Supermarket Worker Stole $1 Million and Bought Cars and Guns, Police Say (NYTimes) The theft, by a 19-year-old who worked at a Kroger in Duluth, Georgia., occurred over two weeks when a supermarket compliance officer was away, the authorities said. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/us/kroger-atlanta-teen-arrested.html The risk? Let me think... ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 13:05:06 +0800 From: Richard Stein <rmstein () ieee org> Subject: Forever Chemicals Are Widespread in U.S. Drinking Water (Scientific American) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/forever-chemicals-are-widespread-in-u-s-drinking-water/ "A handful of states have set about trying to address these contaminants, which are scientifically known as perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs). But no federal limits have been set on the concentration of the chemicals in water, as they have for other pollutants such as benzene, uranium and arsenic. With a new presidential administration coming into office this week, experts say the federal government finally needs to remedy that oversight. 'The PFAS pollution crisis is a public health emergency,' wrote Scott Faber, EWG's senior vice president for government affairs, in a recent public statement." Cast iron cookware is safer than non-stick, though maintenance is higher. Can also be used for weight training! The movie "Dark Waters" dramatizes the protracted effort to hold industry accountable for PFAS water pollution. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 12:46:52 -1000 From: geoff goodfellow <geoff () iconia com> Subject: Revving up electric car industry, Israeli firm develops 5-minute-charge battery *Herzliya-based startup StoreDot unveils solution for main obstacle to widespread use of electric vehicles, but it requires major upgrades to charging stations* Israeli company StoreDot announced Tuesday that in a landmark achievement in the electric vehicle industry, it had managed to develop the world's first car battery that can be fully charged in just five minutes. However, the invention will take time to become commercially feasible since the ultra-fast charge would require much higher-power chargers than are currently available, The Guardian *reported* [... PGN-truncated] <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/19/electric-car-batteries-race-ahead-with-five-minute-charging-times> <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-startup-storedot-unveils-ultra-fast-charging-batteries-for-drones/> https://www.timesofisrael.com/revving-up-electric-car-industry-israeli-firm-develops-5-minute-charge-battery/ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 15:49:42 -0800 From: Don Norman <dnorman () ucsd edu> Subject: Re: Bursts of acceleration in Tesla vehicles caused by drivers mistaking accelerators for brakes ... (RISKS-32.45) Gabe Goldberg reported *The Washington Post* on an NHTSA investigation into crashes by Teslas. The study concluded that there was no design fault, but rather Driver Error: Mistakenly stepping on the accelerator rather than the brake. https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/01/08/tesla-brakes/ Gabe then editorializes in the cute quip manner that has become all too common on RISKS: "[Doesn't speak well of Tesla owners' driving skills...]." I believe it is a Design Fault -- not just of Tesla, but of automobiles in general and the standards committees. Mistaken application of the accelerator pedal rather than the brake is a reasonably frequent event in automobiles, so frequent that it even has an acronym: SUA. Sudden Unintended Acceleration. Why? Because the accelerator and brake pedals are adjacent, sometimes at approximately the same height (especially loved by racers, so they can "heel and toe" between the toe pedals rapidly. In modern autos, there is no clutch pedal, so there is lots of room to space the pedals differently. There are other solutions to the placement of the pedals, but each change will have its own perceived risks, so rather than make suggestions only to have people point out the flaws, I say, why not turn it over to the Human Factors engineers. Every major car manufacturer -- and even NHTSA-- employs them. Let the studies begin! (Caveat: I'm a Fellow of the Human Factors society, among others, so I am biased.) I also suspect that for many of the Tesla accidents, the driver's foot was on the floor or otherwise resting. Why? In the Tesla (or any auto with adaptive cruise control), there is nothing for the right foot to do. Acceleration and appropriate speed is automatically handled by the vehicle. Why not rest the foot. I know I do. If there suddenly is a need to brake, a small percentage of misses is likely. Note too that in the case of Tesla, all the SUA events did have forces applied to the accelerator pedal (the auto has extensive record keeping), so these were unlikely to simply be faulty automation. Of the 217 cases examined by NHTSA. 28% were in parking lots and 12% in Driveways -- 40%! Tesla -- and many Electric Vehicles (EVs) have a feature that can be dangerous in this situation: Electric motors have high torque even at startup, so the initial acceleration, even (especially) from a stopped position can be unexpectedly rapid. Notice that most of the cases were in zero or low velocity situations. The NHTSA report states: "Eighty-six (86) percent of these crashes occurred in parking lots, driveways or other close-quarter *not-in-traffic* locations." Moreover, NHTSA says: "Almost all of these crashes were of short duration, with crashes occurring within three seconds of the alleged SUA event." I don't have comparable statistics for the multiple crashes that Toyota had due to SUA or for any of the other manufacturers who were also afflicted. But Norman's Rule of Design is that when there are multiple, repeated incidents of the same type of accident, even though the tendency is to blame the person, invariably it is actually due to inappropriate design. When I see one or two cases, blaming the person might be appropriate. But when the number of cases gets into the multiple hundreds, something else is going on. It is cute to make fun of drivers, whether for their age, gender, or choice of automobile. Cute statements often are false statements. And false statements can cause damage and death. In the case of automobile accidents, a false belief that incidents are caused by driver error prevents government agencies and automobile manufacturers from believing they should do something about it. Please people, stop calling faulty design "human error." (I couldn't find the NHTSA report on the NHTSA site, but it is available at https://www.teslarati.com/tesla-sudden-acceleration-nhtsa-closes-review/ .) Don Norman, Founding Director Emeritus, Design Lab, University of California, San Diego USA. [John Levine noted that in the 1980s a bunch of unexpected acceleration events in Audi 100's were also due to pedal confusion. Audi recalled them to move the pedals farther apart and to add an interlock so you had to step on the brake before putting the car in gear. Michael Bacon noted that many air crashes have been attributed to "pilot error", but examination of later incidents found issues with design, materials, systems, construction, maintenance, inspection, manuals, training, operations, etc. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 14:35:11 -0600 From: "Craig S. Cottingham" <craig () cottingham net> Subject: Re: Post-Riot, the Capitol Hill IT Staff Faces a Security Mess (Goldberg, RISKS-32.45)
And if they ran out of money to destroy things, what was left to *buy* things?
Different bucket. Congress probably allocated X dollars to destroy and Y dollars to replace. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 10:58:50 +0000 From: Michael Bacon <attilathehun1900 () tiscali co uk> Subject: Re: Bug wipes UK arrest records (RISKS-32.45) The deleted records were linked to police investigations that were terminated before charge (No Further Action) or to those where an individual had been acquitted at court. Statistically, few of them will relate to murders, rapes or other serious crimes. That's not to say there is little or no risk, but it's not as serious as the opposition parties or the British Broadcasting Corporation would like to make out. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 10:58:50 +0000 From: Michael Bacon <attilathehun1900 () tiscali co uk> Subject: Re: Bug wipes UK arrest records (RISKS-32.45) The deleted records were linked to police investigations that were terminated before charge (No Further Action) or to those where an individual had been acquitted at court. Statistically, few of them will relate to murders, rapes or other serious crimes. That's not to say there is little or no risk, but it's not as serious as the opposition parties or the British Broadcasting Corporation would like to make out. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 23:06:21 +0000 From: John Colville <John.Colville () uts edu au> Subject: Re: Company name could lead to security xss attack Not a sophisticated, modern problem but: Some years ago, in Sydney (Australia) there was a company named Computer Accounting and Systems, or CAS for short. For a while people were sending cheques (checks) were to pay 'CAS' until some enterprising person changed the recipient name by adding a 'H' converting it to a cash cheque. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 23:46:34 +0000 From: Wol <antlists () youngman org uk> Subject: Re: Risk Management and Two-Dose Vaccines (RISKS-32.45)
The calculus involved here is complex. [...]
The UK thinks the calculus is simple. Firstly, it appears that 12 weeks is the optimum delay to provide the longest protection. Secondly, and far more importantly, while a single dose may only offer 50% or 60% protection against infection, it DOES seem to offer *100%* protection against hospitalisation. No, we don't want "one shot" people getting infected and spreading it, but the more people we can keep out of hospital, the better. (And getting infected seems to offer 85% immunity after you've recovered.) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2020 11:11:11 -0800 From: RISKS-request () csl sri com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: The mailman Web interface can be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe: http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks => SUBMISSIONS: to risks () CSL sri com with meaningful SUBJECT: line that includes the string `notsp'. Otherwise your message may not be read. *** This attention-string has never changed, but might if spammers use it. => SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative address from which you never send mail where the address becomes public! => The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, etc.) is online. <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html> *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines! => OFFICIAL ARCHIVES: http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's searchable html archive at newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS --> VoLume, ISsue. Also, ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for the current volume/previous directories or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks-VL.IS for previous VoLume If none of those work for you, the most recent issue is always at http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt, and index at /risks-32.00 ALTERNATIVE ARCHIVES: http://seclists.org/risks/ (only since mid-2001) *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads. Apologies for what Office365 and SafeLinks may have done to URLs. ==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum: <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1> ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 32.46 ************************
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