Risks Digest 28.52

[RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>]

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Monday 16 February 2015  Volume 28 : Issue 52

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
  <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/28.52.html>
The current issue can be found at
  <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt>

  Contents:
The End of Privacy, *Science*, 30 Jan 2015 (PGN)
Turning off encryption to improve interoperability (Jeremy Epstein)
Can Open-Source Voting Tech Fix the U.S. Elections System? (Barry Gold)
Require dash cams in aircraft, pointed inward (Dan Jacobson)
Romanian diplomat fired after calling guests 'ghastly' and 'undesirable' in
  invitation email (hrgrapevine via Monty Solomon)
A Crypto Trick That Makes Software Nearly Impossible to Reverse Engineer
  (Andy Greenberg)
Legislators Want Computer Science to Count for Language Requirement
  (Dian Schaffhauser)
AT&T charges $29 more for gigabit fiber that doesn't watch your Web browsing
  (Ars Technica)
How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco's Life (NYTimes)
"Vint Cerf Warns of 'Digital Dark Age'" (Pallab Ghosh)
Digital data storage may leave future in dark about us, warns Cerf
  (Lauren Weinstein)
Security Gaps Found in 39,890 Online Databases Containing Customer Data
  (SaarlandU)
"OpenDNS sounds warning on the most sophisticated PayPal scam yet"
  (Brian Jackson)
"DDoS malware for Linux systems comes with sophisticated custom-built
  rootkit" (Lucian Constantin)
Google updates disclosure policy after Windows, OS X zero-day controversy
  (Ars)
"Microsoft yanks KB 2920732 patch for killing PowerPoint 2013 on Windows RT"
  (Woody Leonhard)
"Microsoft's SSL 3.0 Poodle-busting patch KB 3023607 breaks popular Cisco
  VPN client" (Woody Leonhard)
"Visual Studio patch rollup KB 3001652 causes widespread freezing problems"
  (Woody Leonhard)
"Dangerous IE vulnerability opens door to powerful phishing attacks"
  (Lucian Constantin)
"Mozilla reveals Firefox add-on lockdown" (Gregg Keizer)
Re: Internet providers lobby against backup power rules for phone lines
  (paul wallich)
Re: Stop the Mass Hacks Attacks: Use Strong 2-Factor Authentication or
  Go to Jail! (Richard M Stein)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2015 11:09:35 PST
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: The End of Privacy, *Science*, 30 Jan 2015

*Science* (the magazine published by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. in contrast with lower-case *science* (the
discipline regarded as the state of knowing -- knowledge as distinguished
from ignorance or misunderstanding) [although the AAAS magazine does a
remarkable job of blending the two together] has just published a very
timely special issue on The End of Privacy.  This issue includes an
extraordinary compilation of articles:

Introduction:
* Big data and the Internet are empowering researchers and the public --
  but endangering privacy

News:
* Unmasked
* When your voice betrays you
* Breach of trust
* Game of drones
* Risk of exposure
* Could your pacemaker be hackable?
* Hiding in plain sight
* Trust me, I'm a medical researcher
* Camouflaging searches in a sea of fake queries

Perspectives:
* Control use of data to protect privacy (Susan Landau)
* What the right to be forgotten means for privacy in the digital age
  (A.L. Newman)

Review:
Privacy and human behaviour in the age of information (A. Acquisti et al.)

plus more items, and an encrypted URL that you might want to decode...

RISKS readers will find some extraordinarily well-researched background here.
Most if not all of it appears to be online.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 01:13:32 -0500
From: Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.j.epstein () gmail com>
Subject: Turning off encryption to improve interoperability

In a time when more and more traffic is encrypted to protect privacy and
security, the District of Columbia is turning *off* the encryption in the
radios used by emergency responders, due to interoperability problems.
Encryption had been turned on for emergency responders after the 2013 Navy
Yard rampage, when it's possible that the shooter was listening in to those
searching for him.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/new-dc-mayor-to-end-controversial-encryption-of-firefighter-radios/2015/02/10/4aa741b8-b19f-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html

D.C. Mayor Muriel E. Bowser's administration announced Wednesday that the
District will abandon its new system of encrypting radio communications
among firefighters and paramedics.

The District's encryption came under intense scrutiny last month when Metro
officials said they found changes to firefighter radio settings related to
encryption following a widespread radio failure during Metro'ss fatal Jan.
12 smoke incident.

In that incident, D.C. firefighters could not communicate with supervisors
above ground when they learned that a train was trapped in a smoke-filled
tunnel south of the L'Enfant Plaza station with more than 200 passengers
aboard.

D.C. firefighters and the city's homeland security agency have disputed
that encryption played any part in the radio failure. [...]

The District began work to encrypt its radio transmissions after the 2013
rampage at the Navy Yard. The shooting that left 12 dead prompted a
dangerous search by police as they hunted the gunman before fatally shooting
him. Although communication involving federal and local police agencies
could not be heard by outsiders, the fire department scanner -- widely
available over the Internet -- provided an account of some of the
behind-the-scenes activities. Firefighters were not in the building when the
manhunt was underway. [...]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 17:53:35 -0800
From: Barry Gold <BarryDGold () ca rr com>
Subject: Can Open-Source Voting Tech Fix the U.S. Elections System?

PGN correctly identified a number of problems with the existing "twentieth
century" voting system.  Installing an electronic voting system that has
been vetted through open-source inspection won't fix those problems, but it
also won't make them worse.

But the problem with *any* computerized voting system is much bigger than
just the (application) code of the voting machines and tabulation system.  A
few other questions suggest themselves:

1. How do we know that the code running on the voting machines is the
code that we inspected?

  1a) Is there a bug (intentional?) in the compiler?
  1b) How do we make sure that the people in charge of deploying the voting
      machines installed the publicly-vetted software on them, rather than
      some other software that does what _they_ want?

2. What about the underlying OS?  Windows?  Would you trust Windows with
your vote?  Linux is open source, but still... how do you know that the
version on the machines is the version we vetted?

3. Same questions re the firmware installed by the machines'
manufacturer(s)?  Insert malware into the boot program and you can do
anything you want.

In general, are we going to go around and let random people inspect the
machine's RAM/Flash, OS, and installed code (IN BINARY) for malware and to
make sure that what we saw is really what we got?

There are only two ways to ensure(*) that the votes are counted correctly:

A. Use something physical -- a piece of paper, a card, whatever -- that the
voter can see go into a ballot box and the various parties with an interest
in the outcome can watch the ballot boxes be transferred to the counting
center.  Then occasionally and at random insert fake precincts into the
process, whose counts are known in advance, and make sure that they are
counted correctly(+).  Then subtract those known counts from the final
results.

B. Issue a receipt of some sort to the voter, which he can check against the
final results to make sure his vote was counted.

I've seen proposals for a system like that, where a voter is given a
three-part ballot to mark; he deposits two parts and keeps one.  He can
later use the one he kept to verify his vote.  [That's from Ron Rivest.  PGN]

But any system that allows a voter to verify that his vote was counted
correctly can _also_ be used by somebody who wants to make sure the vote was
cast the way the voter was paid (or threatened) to vote.  If I'm going
around buying votes, I can have everybody bring me their part of the
three-part ballot and I can make sure they voted the way I wanted, before I
paid them.

Or if I'm planning to fire anybody who voted for a Democrat (or Republican,
or Peace and Freedom...), I can demand they bring their ballots for me to
check.

As with many other human endeavors, there is *no* perfect system.  We either
take a chance on some votes being miscounted, or we allow for the
possibility of vote-buying/coercion.

(*) In so far as we can be sure of *anything* when the stakes are so high
and there are so many people with an interest in the outcome and no sense of
personal ethics.

(+) You have to make the fake precincts look similar to real ones, so that
the software won't be able to tell if it's counting a real one or a fake
one.  Also, you have to randomly generate the ballots from the fake
precincts every election, so that the software makers can't predict what the

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 01:08:12 +0800
From: Dan Jacobson <jidanni () jidanni org>
Subject: Require dash cams in aircraft, pointed inward

You all must have seen the news "Dashcams capture dramatic footage of
Taiwanese plane crash".  Gee, one of those things pointed inward could
perhaps help answer which pilot pushed which button. Well why aren't cockpit
image recorders standard along with cockpit voice recorders yet?  Oh,

Why pilots dislike being on cockpit cam
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-07/11/mh370-cockpit-camera

http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/technologyandresearch/a/cockpitcams.htm
Pilots Blast NTSB on Cockpit Video Cameras
Call cameras "fool's gold" of crash investigation

Investigating Airline Accidents: Cockpit Video is not the Answer
https://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/inthecockpit/CockpitVideo.htm

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 20:27:40 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com>
Subject: Romanian diplomat fired after calling guests 'ghastly' and
  'undesirable' in invitation email

http://www.hrgrapevine.com/markets/hr/article/2015-02-12-romanian-diplomat-fired-after-sending-ghastly-notes-about-guests-with-invitations

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 12:18:48 -0500 (EST)
From: "ACM TechNews" <technews () hq acm org>
Subject: A Crypto Trick That Makes Software Nearly Impossible to Reverse
  Engineer (Andy Greenberg)

Andy Greenberg, *WiReD* News, 11 Feb 2015

SyScan security researcher Jacob Torrey has developed Hardened Anti-Reverse
Engineering Systems (HARES), a scheme that encrypts software so it is only
decrypted by the computer's processor at the last possible moment before the
code is executed.  Torrey says the HARES scheme prevents reverse-engineering
tools from reading the decrypted code as it is being run.  "It protects
software algorithms from reverse engineering, and it prevents software from
being mined for vulnerabilities that can be turned into exploits," he says.
HARES uses a hardware trick called a Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
Split, which segregates the portion of a computer's memory where a program
stores its data from the portion where it stores its own code's
instructions.  HARES keeps everything in that "instructions" portion of
memory encrypted so it can only be decrypted with a key that is stored in
the computer's processor.  "You can specifically say that encrypted memory
shall not be accessed from other regions that aren't encrypted," says Lab
Mouse Security researcher Don Andrew Bailey.  Many hackers use a
reverse-engineering technique called "fuzzing," which involves entering
random data into the program with the goal of causing it to crash, and then
analyzing the crashes to locate more serious exploitable vulnerabilities.
However, Torrey notes using that technique on a program encrypted with HARES
would render the crashes completely unexplainable.
http://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_5-d5d1x2c669x062019&;

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 12:18:48 -0500 (EST)
From: "ACM TechNews" <technews () hq acm org>
Subject: Legislators Want Computer Science to Count for Language Requirement
  (Dian Schaffhauser)

Dian Schaffhauser, *Campus Technology*, 9 Feb 2015

A bipartisan bill introduced by legislators in Washington State would count
two years of computer science toward the foreign language requirement for
purposes of admission into college in the state.  A similar effort in
Kentucky last year cleared the state's Senate and is now undergoing further
work before the House educational subcommittee.  Only 40 percent of high
schools count credits earned in a computer science class toward
requirements, while the rest treat such courses as electives, according to a
recent study by the Computer Science Teachers Association (CSTA).  In the
report, CSTA recommends counting computer science courses toward graduation
requirements.  The proposal to expand computer science education would help
prepare students for jobs in high tech, says Washington state legislator
Chris Reykdal, co-sponsor of the bill.  "It strikes me that we don't give
kids a meaningful shot in getting some computer science basics before they
go to university," he says.  Co-sponsor Chad Magendanz also is promoting a
bipartisan proposal to expand computer science education to ready students
for careers in high tech.  "If we give more children access to computer
science learning now, they'll have greater opportunities in the future," he
says.
http://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_5-d5d1x2c66ax062019&;

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2015 09:57:41 -0800
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: AT&T charges $29 more for gigabit fiber that doesn't watch your Web
  browsing

Ars via NNSquad
http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/att-charges-29-more-for-gigabit-fiber-that-doesnt-watch-your-web-browsing/

  "AT&T's gigabit fiber-to-the-home service has just arrived in Kansas City,
  and the price is the same as Google Fiber--if you let AT&T track your Web
  browsing history."

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 10:39:09 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com>
Subject: How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco's Life

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html

The unique 21st-century misery of the online shaming victim.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 12:18:48 -0500 (EST)
From: "ACM TechNews" <technews () hq acm org>
Subject: "Vint Cerf Warns of 'Digital Dark Age'" (Pallab Ghosh)

BBC News (02/13/15) Pallab Ghosh via ACM TechNews, 13 Feb 2015

Former ACM president Vint Cerf, one of the pioneers of Internet technology
and now a vice president and Chief Internet Evangelist at Google, worries
about a forthcoming "digital Dark Age" in which the rapid pace of
technological advancement will leave behind mountains of data people will no
longer be able to access.  "Old formats of documents that we've created or
presentations may not be readable by the latest version of the software
because backwards compatibility is not always guaranteed," Cerf said at the
recent annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science.  Cerf's proposed solution to the problem is taking an "X-ray
snapshot" of data, which includes not just the information but also
descriptions of the application, operating system, and hardware it runs on.
He says this digital snapshot would then be uploaded to the cloud where it
could, in theory, live on in perpetuity.  Cerf says ensuring such data could
be read by future generations will require a standardized description, which
he calls "digital vellum."  He notes such techniques already have been
demonstrated by Carnegie Mellon University's Mahadev Satyanarayanan.  Cerf
says the technique is "not without its rough edges, but the major concept
has been shown to work."
http://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_5-d5d1x2c664x062019&;

  [Matthew Kruk noted
    http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-31450389
  PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 09:36:07 -0800
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Digital data storage may leave future in dark about us, warns Cerf

E&T via NNSquad
http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2015/feb/vint-cerf-digital-data.cfm

This is an area of continuing serious anxiety.  I touched on it in CACM
(1999): http://www.csl.sri.com/users/neumann/insiderisks.html#105
["Bit-Rot Roulette"].  Interestingly, some of the most forward-looking
work in this area is being done by AMPAS - The Academy of Motion
Picture Arts and Sciences (the Oscar folks), who are rightly very
concerned about preserving motion picture production and distribution
assets in a digital world.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 12:18:48 -0500 (EST)
From: "ACM TechNews" <technews () hq acm org>
Subject: Security Gaps Found in 39,890 Online Databases Containing Customer
  Data (SaarlandU)

Saarland University, 10 Feb 2015

Researchers at Saarland University's Center for IT-Security, Privacy, and
Accountability (CISPA) have found that anyone can call up or modify several
million pieces of customer data online, including names, addresses, and
emails, because of a misconfigured open source database upon which millions
of online stores and platforms base their services.  Three CISPA students
were able to demonstrate this vulnerability for 40,000 online databases in
Germany and France.  If the operators stick to the defaults in the
installation process and do not consider important details, the data is
available online and completely unprotected, according to the CISPA
researchers.  The flaw currently affects 39,890 online databases.  "The
databases are accessible online without being protected by any defensive
mechanism," says Saarland professor Michael Backes.  "You even have the
permissions to update and change data.  Hence we assume that the databases
were not left open on purpose."  The researchers informed the database
vendors, as well as international computer emergency response teams.  "A
database unprotected like this is similar to a public library with a wide
open entrance door and without any librarian," Backes warns.  "Everybody can
enter."

http://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_5-d5d1x2c66fx062019&;

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:37:44 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "OpenDNS sounds warning on the most sophisticated PayPal scam yet"
  (Brian Jackson)

Brian Jackson, *IT Business*, 11 Feb 2015
OpenDNS Security Labs found an elaborate phishing campaign targeting
users of the popular online payments processor PayPal, involving
several fake websites set up with the intent to steal information.
http://www.itbusiness.ca/article/opendns-sounds-warning-on-the-most-sophisticated-paypal-scam-yet

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:34:14 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "DDoS malware for Linux systems comes with sophisticated
  custom-built rootkit" (Lucian Constantin)

Lucian Constantin, InfoWorld, 6 Feb 2015
XOR.DDoS is distributed through SSH brute-force password guessing attacks
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2880196/security/ddos-malware-for-linux-systems-comes-with-sophisticated-custombuilt-rootkit.html

opening text:

A malware program designed for Linux systems, including embedded devices
with ARM architecture, uses a sophisticated kernel rootkit that's custom
built for each infection.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 13:06:35 -0800
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Google updates disclosure policy after Windows, OS X zero-day
  controversy (Ars)

Ars via NNSquad
http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/google-updates-disclosure-policy-after-windows-os-x-zero-day-controversy/

  "In a blog post today, the Google Security team announced changes to
  policies on full disclosure of bugs found by Project Zero, the security
  research team that uncovered zero-day vulnerabilities recently revealed in
  Microsoft's Windows 8.1 and Apple's OS X operating systems. Those
  disclosures, which were made 90 days after Google alerted Microsoft and
  Apple in accordance with Project Zero's strict release policy, stirred
  controversy because they had not yet been patched--and gave attackers time
  to leverage them before Microsoft and Apple distributed fixes."

An appropriate introduction of some flexibility in this regard. Good.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:44:20 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Microsoft yanks KB 2920732 patch for killing PowerPoint 2013
  on Windows RT" (Woody Leonhard)

  [Remember when URLs were fairly short?  This is actually a shortened
  version.  The one with the tracking code is about half again as long.]

Woody Leonhard, *InfoWorld*, 12 Feb 2015
If you were unlucky enough to install KB 2920732, there's no way to
uninstall it.
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2883639/patch-management/microsoft-yanks-kb-2920732-patch-for-killing-powerpoint-2013-on-windows-rt-with-error-0xc0000428.html

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:48:36 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Microsoft's SSL 3.0 Poodle-busting patch KB 3023607 breaks
  popular Cisco VPN client" (Woody Leonhard)

Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 13 Feb 2015
Cisco verifies that installing KB 3023607 may lead to 'Failed to
initialize connection subsystem' errors with AnyConnect VPN
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2883756/security/microsoft-s-ssl-3-0-poodle-busting-patch-kb-3023607-breaks-cisco-s-popular-vpn-client-anyconnect.html

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:35:55 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Visual Studio patch rollup KB 3001652 causes widespread
  freezing problems" (Woody Leonhard)

Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 10 Feb 2015
The Black Tuesday patches have been out for just a few hours, and
there are multiple reports about KB 3001652 freezing and/or failing
with error 0x80070659
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2882348/patch-management/visual-studio-patch-rollup-kb-3001652-causes-widespread-freezing-problems.html

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:33:08 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Dangerous IE vulnerability opens door to powerful phishing attacks"
  (Lucian Constantin)

Lucian Constantin, InfoWorld, 3 Feb 2015
The flaw can be used to steal authentication cookies and inject rogue
code into websites.
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2879127/security/dangerous-ie-vulnerability-opens-door-to-powerful-phishing-attacks.html

opening text:

An Internet Explorer vulnerability lets attackers bypass the Same-Origin
Policy, a fundamental browser security mechanism, to launch highly credible
phishing attacks or hijack users' accounts on any website.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 11:46:31 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Mozilla reveals Firefox add-on lockdown" (Gregg Keizer)

  In the Can't Win for Losing Department:

Gregg Keizer, Computerworld, 12 Feb 2015
Mozilla has detailed plans to require Firefox add-ons to be digitally
signed, a move meant to bear down on rogue and malicious extensions
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2883798/web-browsers/mozilla-reveals-firefox-add-on-lockdown.html

opening text:

Mozilla yesterday detailed plans to require Firefox add-ons to be digitally
signed, a move meant to bear down on rogue and malicious extensions, and one
that resembled Google's decision years ago to secure Chrome's add-on
ecosystem.

Some Firefox users called out Mozilla for disregarding its own
long-and-often-expressed ethos of the need for an open Internet.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2015 09:16:49 -0500
From: paul wallich <pw () panix com>
Subject: Re: Internet providers lobby against backup power rules for phone
  lines (Weinstein, RISKS-28.51)

> Depending on consumers to keep backup systems running is a recipe for
> utter disaster.

I agree, but there's a bit of a conundrum here. For people who are getting
Plain Internet Service, regulators have already pretty much put the cable
modem/router/access point/whatever on the customer side of the demarc (which
is why you can buy your own cable modem and avoid the outrageous rental
charge). When you add phone to the equation, suddenly that customer-side box
is also responsible for E911 and general disaster service, and you have the
problem Lauren points out. (This, by the way, is why I've thus far declined
my ISP's offer to "upgrade" my cable modem at my own risk and expense so as
to provide free wifi for their other customers. If something in the
configuration process were to take out my phone service, I would have no 911
capability until they got around to sending a tech and charging me to fix
whatever was wrong.)

With Title II regulation of Internet service in general, it may be possible
for the FCC to simply mandate that all boxes sold for home Internet or VOIP
use be equipped with appropriate power backup. But if that happens I expect
a huge outcry from the same folks who don't like wearing seatbelts or
motorcycle helmets.

This is what happens when you "upgrade" the leaf nodes of your national
telecom infrastructure to pure digital without thinking about the details.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2015 16:50:40 +0800
From: Richard M Stein <rmstein () ieee org>
Subject: Re: Stop the Mass Hacks Attacks: Use Strong 2-Factor
 Authentication or Go to Jail! (RISKS-28.51)

  [Very long item, but a fairly strong compilation of ideas.  PGN]

How to most effectively deter defect escape from a software ecosystem?

Criminal or civil penalization of system administrators and their
management?

Why not penalize the stockholders for investing in a software factory run by
individuals unqualified to even run a pet shop? Why not penalize the
consumer for trusting their information with a brand that 'they should have
known better about'? What's a cure, partial or complete, for the justifiable
erosion of confidence in an Internet economy?

Stricter life cycle exit criteria enforcement? More rigorous testing?

Certified software engineering training, including software safety and
formal specification?

Conscientious management and leadership, schooled in ethics and
technologically prescient and informed about when to "go live" or not?

Why not require each factory to publicly disclose their defect discovery and
repair throughout the life cycle? This measure can be used by consumers for
comparative shopping, enumerating dependencies on open source, and reassure
about their processes leading to publication, a software factory "Consumer
Reports" guide?

What about passing a law that eliminates manufacturer indemnification from
the software use license? Civil or criminal legislation that deters
publication possibly infringes corporate free speech.

Organizational neglect for a rigorous editorial life cycle (from
requirements through release) is routinely experienced by all
consumers. When intellectual property, especially and particularly software,
is commonly treated like used tissue paper, a lowest common denominator
publication will readily materialize.  'Agile' has become a euphemized
excuse to accelerate release defect density injection and intensify
production escape potential.

Perhaps a law should be passed that assigns full and lifetime accountability
to individual software factory contributors for their escaped defects. To
ensure enforcement, penalize everyone in the organization, doubled per
management layer, for each breech of public confidence and trust erosion
arising from the escape.  This pyramidal penalization scheme would quickly
bankrupt the personnel of any for-profit software factory, exponentially
depleting fortunes.

A possible deterrent might be found in the IEEE Code of Ethics. It states,
in part, do no harm. The Code implies that product life cycle participants
doubting release fitness and readiness stand up to management "to avoid
injuring others, their property, reputation, or employment by false or
malicious action."  This means that factory participants object, gain
alignment to fix what's broken given prioritization and severity, and ensure
corrective closure. Or, if necessary, walk-off the job rather than sustain
employment within an ethically compromised factory. A tough decision for
those who depend on it for their livelihood.

IEEE membership imbues ethical obligations, a professional duty to respect
the Code and conduct oneself accordingly. Those who elect to remain silent
in light of weak, dangerous, or ambivalent factory practices that compromise
ethics and render public outrage might be subject to e-profile shame, a
demerit counter notably absent from Linked or Facebook e-profiles. A
herd-immunity to defect escape might evolve which vaccinates the Internet
more effectively than any monetary incentive or group-think pressure.

Alternatively, a collective professional action, a unionized protest and
work stoppage, might forestall promotion of ill-fitting and trust-eroding
publications into the Internet economy. Imagine if everyone who authors
software "dropped their pencils" for a day in protest, including financial
or medical institutions?

Would a world-wide "Occupy" movement for software safety, privacy and
security influence public awareness of our technological precipice? It may
induce management to account for and reinforce ethical software engineering
conduct. A certain temporary suppression of defect escape might materialize
on the day of protest.

Software engineering discipline is substantially weakened by individuals who
are ethically irresponsible towards their customers, products, and the
organization they associate with. This myopic ethical conduct compromises
civil society, weakens our engineering profession, and compounds Internet
fragility.

Hardcore capitalists promote the idea that the marketplace should solely
decide winners and losers. Technology industrial governance dominated by
this mindset breeds to promulgate 'covert institutionalized violence.' This
practice disenfranchises more worthy social interests over a select few:
Specifically, corporate data breeches flourish while individual e-profiles
and identities are victimized with impunity. Where are the Darwin Awards for
these irresponsible organizations?

Consumer Internet experience is today analogous to that found in financial
markets where profit is privatized and risk is publicly shared. Our
e-profiles and identities are monetized and exploited for private
enrichment, but individuals bare the expense of indiscriminate theft, credit
repair, and violation of privacy.

The time has come to implement a "Technology Safety, Privacy and Trust
Erosion Day" to promote the interests of a citizen's right to privacy and
security, to commemorate e-profile and identity ownership preservation,
dignity, respect, and the right to be left alone.

Richard M. Stein <rmstein () ieee org>

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request () csl sri com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

 The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is
 comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011.
=> SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent)
 if possible and convenient for you.  The mailman Web interface can
 be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe:
   http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks
 Alternatively, to subscribe or unsubscribe via e-mail to mailman
 your FROM: address, send a message to
   risks-request () csl sri com
 containing only the one-word text subscribe or unsubscribe.  You may
 also specify a different receiving address: subscribe address= ... .
 You may short-circuit that process by sending directly to either
   risks-subscribe () csl sri com or risks-unsubscribe () csl sri com
 depending on which action is to be taken.

 Subscription and unsubscription requests require that you reply to a
 confirmation message sent to the subscribing mail address.  Instructions
 are included in the confirmation message.  Each issue of RISKS that you
 receive contains information on how to post, unsubscribe, etc.

=> The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites,
 copyright policy, etc.) is online.
   <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html>
 *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines.

=> .UK users may contact <Lindsay.Marshall () newcastle ac uk>.
=> SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored.  Instead, use an alternative
 address from which you NEVER send mail!
=> SUBMISSIONS: to risks () CSL sri com with meaningful SUBJECT: line.
 *** NOTE: Including the string `notsp' at the beginning or end of the subject
 *** line will be very helpful in separating real contributions from spam.
 *** This attention-string may change, so watch this space now and then.
=> ARCHIVES: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for current volume
     or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks for previous VoLume
 http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's searchable archive at
 newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html gets you VoLume, ISsue.
   Lindsay has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version
   of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but
   not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r
 <http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/> .
==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners:
    <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html> for browsing,
    <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf> or .ps for printing
  is no longer maintained up-to-date except for recent election problems.
 *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them.  Try
  browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads.
==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum:
    <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1>

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 28.52
************************