FC: Bob Barr to IETF: Don't help the snoops!

[Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>]

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,32100,00.html

                     'Don't Help the Snoops'
                     by Declan McCullagh

                     10:45 a.m. 25.Oct.99.PDT
                     The Internet's standards body should not
                     craft technology to aid government
                     surveillance, a prominent conservative
                     congressman says. 

                     Representative Bob Barr (R-Georgia) said
                     that there is no reason for the Internet
                     Engineering Task Force to support
                     wiretapping in the next generation of
                     protocols and that doing so would be
                     "dangerous." 

                     "For the sake of protecting freedom,
                     commerce, and privacy on the Internet, I
                     urge you to draw the line firmly and early,
                     by immediately rejecting any attempts to
                     force a cumbersome, expensive, and
                     dangerous surveillance architecture on
                     the Internet," Barr wrote in a letter to
                     IETF chairman Fred Baker. 

                     [...]



X-UIDL: e01ccfdce0d5ae70bcbce2f7dd24b8d6

October 25, 1999

Mr. Fred Baker
IETF Secretariat
C/o Corporation for National Research Initiatives
1895 Preston White Drive
Suite 100
Reston, Virginia  20191-5434

IN RE: Wiretapping and Internet Telephony

Dear Mr. Baker:

In light of the fact that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has
become involved in the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) compliance debate, I write to urge your strong opposition to any
effort to force a surveillance-friendly architecture on the Internet.  There
are several reasons why opposition to such efforts is critical.

When CALEA was enacted in 1994, law enforcement officials assured Congress
its only effect would be to maintain the wiretapping status quo.  Since
then, the same officials have used every opportunity to pressure
telecommunications companies to create unprecedented monitoring capabilities
going far beyond the status quo, CALEA's mandates, the intent of Congress,
and the Fourth Amendment.  Even worse, the telecommunications companies have
been forced to either pass these costs along to their customers or contest
law enforcement's demands in court.

In my opinion, Internet telephony in its current form falls far short of the
statutory definitions in CALEA.  Furthermore, based on Congress's intent to
do nothing more than maintain the status quo by enacting CALEA, it is
questionable whether Internet telephony could ever be appropriately included
under the Act's mandates.    Of course, this fact will not put an end to
demands by law enforcement and regulators that Internet service providers
and telecommunications companies make their jobs easier by wiretapping the
Internet for them.

If you encourage such steps, several things will happen.  First, network and
software creators will begin building flaws into products in order to create
back doors for law enforcement.  In the process, the security that serves as
a prerequisite and incentive for electronic commerce and communication will
be threatened.  As hackers demonstrate with frightening regularity,
practically no system is fully secure.  Building intentional flaws into
systems will expose them to criminal abuse and unconstitutional monitoring.

Secondly, an initial demand for limited access to Internet telephone calls
will soon expand into an ever-increasing demand for access to all voice
communications, followed by a demand for access to e-mail and data traffic.
If the IETF gets in the business of trying to anticipate what the government
might demand, government agencies will thank you for your efforts, and
promptly issue more demands.  It is a virtual certainty the government's
demands will exceed the private sector's willingness and ability to comply
with them.  The only real question is precisely when that point will be
reached. 

Finally, Internet-based companies will be forced to pass compliance and
legal costs along to their customers.  In a sector where
cost-competitiveness is critical, compliance costs could bring the
development of exciting new Internet telephony products and services to a
virtual standstill.  Similar effects could also be felt on practically every
Internet company, if surveillance mandates are expanded beyond telephony.
 
For the sake of protecting freedom, commerce, and privacy on the Internet, I
urge you to draw the line firmly and early, by immediately rejecting any
attempts to force a cumbersome, expensive, and dangerous surveillance
architecture on the Internet.   If you arrive at the conclusion further
legal protections are needed to ensure a massive wiretapping structure is
not imposed on the Internet, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss how
best to enact them.

With kind regards, I am,

very truly yours,


BOB BARR
Member of Congress


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