Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2
From: Daniel Miessler <daniel () dmiessler com>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 23:44:39 -0500
On Nov 2, 2005, at 1:54 AM, Steve Friedl wrote:
The only weakness that's really in the air is Collision Resistance, where we can produce two inputs with the same hash. This is of only minor concern in a practical sense, though it certainly does mean that blood is in the water and sharks are circling.
Exactly my point. To put it another way, the ability to create collisions has no bearing on the ability of an attacker to find unknown inputs to known hashes. Or, in the technical terms that you highlighted, attacks against collision resistance don't necessarily lead to attacks on preimage resistance.
Hence, for the purposes of breaking hashes to discover passwords, NTLMv2 is not significantly affected by the recently discovered weaknesses in the MD5 hashing algorithm.
-- Daniel R. Miessler M: daniel () dmiessler com W: http://dmiessler.com G: 0x316BC712
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Current thread:
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Thierry Zoller (Nov 01)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Daniel Miessler (Nov 01)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Steve Friedl (Nov 03)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Daniel Miessler (Nov 04)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Steve Friedl (Nov 03)
- RE: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Ben Nagy (Nov 03)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Thor (Hammer of God) (Nov 04)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Miguel Dilaj (Nov 01)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Jack Lloyd (Nov 03)
- Re: Insecure Hash Algorithms (MD5) and NTLMv2 Daniel Miessler (Nov 01)