Re: RFID Tags

[Mister Coffee <live4java () stormcenter net>]

On Fri, May 21, 2004 at 02:10:47PM +0100, lsi wrote:
> An article on today's Register continues our thread:
>
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/20/us_passports/
Interesting read - with the typical (humerous) Register slant.
 
> It notes the possibility of RFIDs being used to support kidnapping; 
> I'll widen that and say they could be used as invisible Gold Stars 
> (all Jews in Nazi Germany were forced to wear a gold star to identify 
> them).  They would provide the technical infrastructure for 
> systematic discrimination of all kinds.
I know well of the Gold Stars.  Not something I think anyone honestly wants to see happen again (I desperately hope I'm 
not wrong on that - but I digress).  Though one of the premisses they made, that "street thugs looking for 
probably-rich tourists" would be able to use them to identify targets.  While possible, I A: doubt that a "street thug" 
would have the sophistication to use the device.  B: would care that much about their target choice.  And C: not have 
enough other ways to pick targets as to make it superfluous.  But again, we digress.
 
Of course, I'm not going to deny there are a lot of potential ways to abuse the RFID technology.

> > The 3D map of all tags in range is fascinating, but I suspect there
> > may be some issues with building usable hardware into a concealable
> > form.  We're assuming "Badguy gets onto a train to scan" situation. 
> > If I can place my equipment ON the train beforehand, my life (as the
> > scanner) gets dramatically easier. 
>
> A lone wolf might have a hard time managing the complexity.  A team 
> of people might be more effective - a widely deployed, State-operated 
> system would have no trouble, however.
Agreed.  The State is really the one I would be worried about.  But, then, The State (tm) already has a lot of 
resources already at their disposal.  This is just another way for them to get the information they want.

My question, of course, is how they'll be able to justify the expense with the limited additional returns.  
 
> > At least until someone brings his Pocket Pal RFID Jam-O-Matic 2000 to work.
>
> This will be classified as a crime (and may be already).
Possibly in some countries, but not in the US.  These devices operate under FCC's Part 15 and, even with the 
Jam-O-Matic name, the jammer would probably be legal.  It would depend on whether it was causing interference.  If you 
design it correctly, it will be able to confuse remote surveylance without interfering with legitimate uses.  eg. Smart 
Shelves, POS terminals, etc.

And, well, using remote scanning is also arguably illegal (under other statutes) and the scanner is bound to be a 
larger, more conspicuous, box than the defense.
 
> > > Couple this with the Big Database of All RFIDs in the Known Universe, 
> > > and you have a device that can instantly identify and geolocate high-
> > > value targets, or targets matching specific criteria.
> > A bit big-brothery, but certainly conceivable.  Of course, there is
> > the search time on what will become an insanely large database.  If my
> > antagonist is portable, there are communications issues too.  Plus the
> > ongoing issue of trying to locate and sort through the huge number of
> > signals you're bound to get in a crowd. 
> >  
> > I don't put this past the Three Letter Acronym folks
>
> Well yes.  And we're coming to the point now.  Those folks are 
> actually proposing to put RFIDs in passports, among other things.  
> Quite aside from minding whether, say, the NSA can know exactly where 
> you have been - there is more than one TLA!
Indeed there is.  Which has many potentially ugly aspects.
 
> Does the NSA really want the FSB/KGB, ISI, PRC and XYZ to *also* know 
> exactly where you have been???
I haven't read the details on the capability of the RFID chips they intend to include.  If the chip is simply a serial 
number, with no, or limited, data transfer capability, then it seems like a simple extension of possessing it at all.  
If they are going the Smart Card/RFID route, then there are considerably more issues.

And knowing where you've been is kind of the point of passports, after all.
 
> Hang on - we can *write* to these things!  Does the NSA really want 
> other TLAs to be able to *write* to the passports of every US 
> citizen???
I think it's more the State Department than the NSA, but yes, the implications are interesting and thought provoking.  
We can hope that they are being smart about the implementation and requiring authentication.

Remember a "Bad State" doesn't need to hack your passport to make your life miserable during a visit to their country.
 
> > > > > the case, is it not possible to simply transmit a higher 
> > > > > power signal, and thus boost the response from the tag to 
> > > > > gain more range? 
> > >
> > > > Higher power, based on what?  And what about the nearer RFIDs you cook while
> > > > trying to get enough power to the ones that are further away?  And of course
> > > > this assumes that you can get enough gain without overloading all of them
> > > > (or cooking your own gonads).
> > >
> > > This attack is not suitable for all scenarios, as you note.  However 
> > > it would be suitable for a targetted attack on a specific individual, 
> > > as the distance between the attacker and the victim could be 
> > > controlled by the attacker.  The attackers would of course wear foil 
> > > underwear.
> > Agreed.  For a targeted attack, I could simply arrange to walk along
> > next to Mister CEO Target Guy for a block or so while he's on his way
> > to work (we're still working from the Bus/Train scenario).  Other
> > situations would require different tactics, but most aren't especially
> >  difficult to arrange.  
>
> Actually, for this one I had in mind RFIDs in a supposedly "secure" 
> area.  The window of a warehouse containing RFID-enabled kit might 
> provide a means for an attacker to get inside the system, possibly 
> using a high-power transceiver to extend the range of the RFID zone 
> to her vehicle parked outside.
Possibly, but with the energy levels involved in the mass market (read dirt cheap) RFID chips you're talking about some 
serious antenna gain and signal processing to do this attack from the relative safety of your vehicle.

> From an attack standpoint, I suspect the most likely attack is short ranged with specially concealed equipment.  While 
> the idea of using a specially equipped surveylence vehicle (panel van, delivery van, milk truck, semi) is certainly 
> feasable, I suspect it will be much more economical to go with light weight short range kit. 

> > > shoesize.  Stores in competition with one another could monitor the 
> > > spending habits of people simply walking through their doors - no 
>
> > I'm sure the stores would LOVE to know all that information.  Which
> > begs the question.  If you, as a store, know the capability exists and
> > that your competitors are using it, will you leave your merchandise
> > tags "live" when they leave the store?  You alread have the customer
> > information on what they bought.  The tags are potentially more
> > valuable to the competition than they are to you. 
>
> A market-based incentive for privacy?  Excellent...
The market's driving the adoption as much as anything.  We can only hope the security ramifications aren't lost on 
them, eh?
 
> > > It seems to me that without authentication, these things are at best, 
> > > useless, and at worst, an open door for criminal activity.
>
> > I disagree.  They're very useful for some of the functions they're
> > being employed for: inventory tracking, anti-theft, etc.  There are
> > other potential benign uses for them, and some of the more
> > "intelligent" tags show potential - if they include authentication
> > ofsome form as you suggest. 
>
> I understand what you're saying - you're saying that they currently 
> work as advertised.......
> .
Hai.

> The reason I say they are useless, despite working as advertised, is 
> because at the end of the day, the organisations using RFID need to 
> be able to *depend* on the information coming out of an RFID system.  
> There is no point Walmart deploying a massive RFID network if it can 
> be disrupted by some kids around the corner with a home-bake walkie-
> talkie.
I suspect they're implementation will be fairly robust - and include some backup systems to assure they don't 
accidently ship 400 gross lava lamps to the store in Madrid.

Any inventory tracking system has possible errors and hacks.  This one is no different in that respect, but may give 
them the advantage they need commercially.  Time will tell, I guess.  Or maybe someone setting off an EMP in the 
parking lot outside the warehouse...
 
> More than this - the DOD reportedly uses RFID.  Do they intend that 
> military assets be the subject of snooping, tampering, theft, 
> impersonation, and corruption, possibly by foreign intelligence 
> services and organised crime?  I think not.
I agree.  But I lean towards them only using the RFID stuff in the supply lines and being aware of the possible SigInt 
issues.  You know the military is going to be able to detect the potential scanner in the parking lot.  And, unlike 
WalMart who may send a couple of security guards, the Army is apt to land an artillery shell on you for your trouble.
 
> Stuart
Cheers,
L4J

ps: Our political and commercial discussion, while enjoyable, may be drifting a bit off-topic for the list.  We may 
want to consider taking this off-list, or possibly shifting our focus back to the technical issues.