Re: Lotus Notes

[David Barnett <dbarn064 () earthlink net>]

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Well I must concur with Chad as Notes default installs are wide open. 
Rarely when doing Pen tests have I found a correctly secured Notes/Domino 
server. Permissions are rarely correct for databases. While I am sure 
NexPose has done a fine job with their Vuln scanner, I have tried <unbiased 
commercial plug> AppDetective works really well for Lotus and Domino scans!!
You can also use N-Stealth or any of your favorite web scanners and add the 
following files:

/852566C90012664F
/admin4.nsf
/admin5.nsf
/admin.nsf
/agentrunner.nsf
/alog.nsf
/a_domlog.nsf
/bookmark.nsf
/busytime.nsf
/catalog.nsf
/certa.nsf
/certlog.nsf
/certsrv.nsf
/chatlog.nsf
/clbusy.nsf
/cldbdir.nsf
/clusta4.nsf
/collect4.nsf
/da.nsf
/dba4.nsf
/dclf.nsf
/DEASAppDesign.nsf
/DEASLog01.nsf
/DEASLog02.nsf
/DEASLog03.nsf
/DEASLog04.nsf
/DEASLog05.nsf
/DEASLog.nsf
/decsadm.nsf
/decslog.nsf
/DEESAdmin.nsf
/dirassist.nsf
/doladmin.nsf
/domadmin.nsf
/domcfg.nsf
/domguide.nsf
/domlog.nsf
/dspug.nsf
/events4.nsf
/events5.nsf
/events.nsf
/event.nsf
/homepage.nsf
/iNotes/Forms5.nsf/$DefaultNav
/jotter.nsf
/leiadm.nsf
/leilog.nsf
/leivlt.nsf
/log4a.nsf
/log.nsf
/l_domlog.nsf
/mab.nsf
/mail10.box
/mail1.box
/mail2.box
/mail3.box
/mail4.box
/mail5.box
/mail6.box
/mail7.box
/mail8.box
/mail9.box
/mail.box
/msdwda.nsf
/mtatbls.nsf
/mtstore.nsf
/names.nsf
/nntppost.nsf
/nntp/nd000001.nsf
/nntp/nd000002.nsf
/nntp/nd000003.nsf
/ntsync45.nsf
/perweb.nsf
/qpadmin.nsf
/quickplace/quickplace/main.nsf
/reports.nsf
/sample/siregw46.nsf
/schema50.nsf
/setupweb.nsf
/setup.nsf
/smbcfg.nsf
/smconf.nsf
/smency.nsf
/smhelp.nsf
/smmsg.nsf
/smquar.nsf
/smsolar.nsf
/smtime.nsf
/smtpibwq.nsf
/smtpobwq.nsf
/smtp.box
/smtp.nsf
/smvlog.nsf
/srvnam.htm
/statmail.nsf
/statrep.nsf
/stauths.nsf
/stautht.nsf
/stconfig.nsf
/stconf.nsf
/stdnaset.nsf
/stdomino.nsf
/stlog.nsf
/streg.nsf
/stsrc.nsf
/userreg.nsf
/vpuserinfo.nsf
/webadmin.nsf
/web.nsf
/.nsf/../winnt/win.ini
/?Open



At 01:28 AM 11/27/2002 -0500, svetsanj () hotmail com wrote:




> We are doing a penetration testing for a client who has lotus notes. We
> were able to access the catalog.nsf file from the web and other admin
> pages such as the user list page, connections page database page etc.
>
> Question is, is this just a low level threat or can a hacker use this
> info to hack further. Also clicking on some of the admin pages brings up
> a default page which says click here to access page. On a notes client
> its possible to click that page put not through http. Is there a
> workaround url that bypasses that page?
>
>         SKP
>
>
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA)
> Service. For more information on SecurityFocus' SIA service which
> automatically alerts you to the latest security vulnerabilities please see:
> https://alerts.securityfocus.com/


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----------------------------------------------------------------------------
This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA)
Service. For more information on SecurityFocus' SIA service which
automatically alerts you to the latest security vulnerabilities please see:
https://alerts.securityfocus.com/