oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise
From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 22:43:07 -0000 (UTC)
On 2024-03-29, Andres Freund wrote:
Hi, On 2024-03-29 21:54:11 -0000, Tavis Ormandy wrote:On 2024-03-29, Solar Designer wrote:I have a minor procedural question for Solar though, shouldn't this have been redirected to oss-security immediately from distros? What's the rationale for an embargo here?We don't have a clear policy for such case. Some distros list members have indeed suggested making this public ASAP. We ended up delaying publication by one day per my suggestion (as a compromise between ASAP and having no specific CRD), and I think these are some reasons why:Thanks, a compromise is better than nothing :) I think I would have argued for immediately discussing this in the open.FWIW, I don't know much of the tradeoffs in this space. With that caveat:
Sure, it's distros moderators job to determine if an embargo is necessary :)
Personally I would have felt quite hesitant to post to distros@ if I knew that distros wouldn't get a reasonable, small, amount of time to prepare, so they have fixed packages available at the time of the public posting.
I guess I would hope you would trust the moderators to evaluate the necessity of an embargo.
2. We didn't know how the culprit (or group) would react when they learned of the full extent of the community's awareness.This is true with any vulnerability, there is always the possibility an attacker is already aware of it. They could respond to a patch being released by trying to extract as much value from their exploit before it's worthless. I'm not convinced that's a good argument to delay making the patch available?What patch? You mean going back to an older version?
No, vulnerabilities usually require a patch, and we never know if bad guys already know about the bug (unfortunately they won't tell us). You could argue that if we release a patch, the attacker might respond by trying to compromise as many targets as possible before their exploit is worthless. After all, if you're spending $1M to develop an exploit, why not keep an eye on git commits to monitor if your investment is about to be ruined? If someone said "it's better to let the attackers work slowly and stealthily than alert them and potentially incentivize them to compromise lots of people". I think most people would be strongly opposed, I know I am! I think this is not significanly different to Solars argument - If we discuss this in public, maybe the attackers will start compromising systems more aggressively. Tavis. -- _o) $ lynx lock.cmpxchg8b.com /\\ _o) _o) $ finger taviso () sdf org _\_V _( ) _( ) @taviso
Current thread:
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise, (continued)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Michael Tokarev (Mar 31)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Rein Fernhout (Levitating) (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Andres Freund (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Rein Fernhout (Levitating) (Mar 30)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Matthias Weckbecker (Mar 30)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Solar Designer (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Andres Freund (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Tavis Ormandy (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Andres Freund (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Tavis Ormandy (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Liguori, Anthony (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Marc Deslauriers (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Russ Allbery (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Marc Deslauriers (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Tavis Ormandy (Mar 29)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Marc Deslauriers (Mar 29)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Tavis Ormandy (Mar 30)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Marc Deslauriers (Mar 30)
- Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Marcin Wolcendorf (Mar 30)
- Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Tavis Ormandy (Mar 30)