oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: [Linux] /proc/pid/stat parsing bugs


From: "Yann Droneaud" <ydroneaud () opteya com>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 18:13:50 +0000

Hi,

21 décembre 2022 à 18:59 "Demi Marie Obenour" <demi () invisiblethingslab com> a écrit:
On Wed, Dec 21, 2022 at 06:13:17PM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:


Hello,
 
 This is not a single vulnerability, the list of affected software is
 large, but it's not a security issue for all of it.
 
 It occurred to me that most of the Linux procfs /proc/pid/stat and
 /proc/pid/task/tid/stat parsing code out there is buggy. The fine
 contains a set of numbers about the task:
 https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html
 
 e.g. $ cat /proc/self/stat
 1715376 (cat) R 1544883 1715376 1544883 34819 1715376 4194304 106 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 1 0 42505561 9207808 237 18446744073709551615
 93955355631616 93955355651497 140737444557056 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 36
 0 0 0 0 0 93955355667504 93955355669120 93955385581568 140737444559745
 140737444559765 140737444559765 140737444564971 0
 
 Most of the code splits it by space and takes an N-th field.
 The problem is that the process name "(cat)" can contain spaces (and
 brackets). Potentially some important software (containers/sandboxes)
 can be tricked into getting wrong data, and I've seen cases close to
 stack overflows (buffer for a fixed number of fields is allocated on
 stack).
 
 Some examples:
 OpenJDK:
 
https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/openjdk/jdk/-/blob/src/jdk.management/unix/native/libmanagement_ext/OperatingSystemImpl.c?L133-139
 
https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/openjdk/jdk8u/-/blob/jdk/src/solaris/native/sun/management/OperatingSystemImpl.c?L223-229
 
 Ansible:
 https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/ansible/ansible/-/blob/lib/ansible/modules/yum.py?L507-510
 
 Libuv:
 https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/libuv/libuv/-/blob/src/unix/linux.c?L674-701
 
 bdwgc:
 https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/mono/linux-packaging-mono/-/blob/external/bdwgc/os_dep.c?L1138-1155
 
 But really most of the code that does it:
 https://sourcegraph.com/search?q=context:global+/%5C%22%5C/proc%5C/.*%5C/stat%5C%22/
 
 The only way to parse it is to do strrchr(')') first (fortunately it
 contains just one unescaped string).
 
 Thanks


Should Linux be patched to somehow escape the spaces, or replace them
with something else? /proc/pid/status is even harder to parse robustly.

It might be difficult because of Linux's policy to not break userspace ABI.

For example, I've suggested some sort of escaping on /proc/net/unix, and
it was not welcomed.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220406102213.2020784-1-ydroneaud () opteya com/

In a follow up, I've added a PoC for injecting fake entries in /proc/net/unix

https://lore.kernel.org/all/8a87957e-4d33-9351-ae74-243441cb03cd () opteya com/

I didn't found a way to abuse this issue: no vulnerability, no need for
a change that would break userspace ABI.

Regards.

-- 
Yann Droneaud
OPTEYA


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