oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: [OSSA-2020-003] Keystone: Keystone does not check signature TTL of the EC2 credential auth method (CVE PENDING)


From: Gage Hugo <gagehugo () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 15:59:49 -0500

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Hash: SHA512

======================================================================================
OSSA-2020-003: Keystone does not check signature TTL of the EC2 credential
auth method
======================================================================================

:Date: May 06, 2020
:CVE: CVE-2020-12692


Affects
~~~~~~~
- - Keystone: <15.0.1, ==16.0.0


Description
~~~~~~~~~~~
kay reported a vulnerability with keystone's EC2 API. Keystone doesn't
have a signature TTL check for AWS signature V4 and an attacker can
sniff the auth header, then use it to reissue an openstack token an
unlimited number of times.


Errata
~~~~~~
CVE-2020-12692 was assigned after the original publication date.


Patches
~~~~~~~
- - https://review.opendev.org/725385 (Rocky)
- - https://review.opendev.org/725069 (Stein)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724954 (Train)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724746 (Ussuri)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724124 (Victoria)


Credits
~~~~~~~
- - kay (CVE-2020-12692)


References
~~~~~~~~~~
- - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1872737
- - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12692


Notes
~~~~~
- - The stable/rocky branch is under extended maintenance and will receive
no new
  point releases, but a patch for it is provided as a courtesy.


OSSA History
~~~~~~~~~~~~
- - 2020-05-07 - Errata 1
- - 2020-05-06 - Original Version
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On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 2:44 PM Gage Hugo <gagehugo () gmail com> wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512


======================================================================================
OSSA-2020-003: Keystone does not check signature TTL of the EC2 credential
auth method

======================================================================================

:Date: May 06, 2020
:CVE: Pending


Affects
~~~~~~~
- - Keystone: <15.0.1, ==16.0.0


Description
~~~~~~~~~~~
kay reported a vulnerability with keystone's EC2 API. Keystone doesn't
have a signature TTL check for AWS signature V4 and an attacker can
sniff the auth header, then use it to reissue an openstack token an
unlimited number of times.


Patches
~~~~~~~
- - https://review.opendev.org/725385 (Rocky)
- - https://review.opendev.org/725069 (Stein)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724954 (Train)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724746 (Ussuri)
- - https://review.opendev.org/724124 (Victoria)


Credits
~~~~~~~
- - kay (CVE Pending)


References
~~~~~~~~~~
- - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1872737
- - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=Pending


Notes
~~~~~
- - The stable/rocky branch is under extended maintenance and will receive
no new
  point releases, but a patch for it is provided as a courtesy.
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