oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux
From: Morten Linderud <morten () linderud pw>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:03:50 +0100
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 03:37:23PM +0100, Tim Kuijsten wrote:
There is not a definitive solution here. But there are multiple efforts and research going on. The most important one, in my opinion, is the reproducible builds project [1]. We need to ensure we are not inserting random or non-deterministic data into our build artifacts. This stretches from upstream developers providing tarballs, to pre-compiled sources and packages from distributions. There is no distribution today that has full reproducible builds, but there are many projects that work towards this and work on reproducible builds.One attack that is not solved by reproducible builds is one on the toolchain. This can be solved with bootstrappable builds[1] which is about minimizing the number of trusted binaries that are needed to produce the toolchain, that produced the toolchain, ... that was used to build your package.
Indeed. Reproducible builds does not solve the case described by Ken Thompson in Trusting Trust [1], nor enables the work described by David Wheeler and DDC [2]. But that isn't explicitly the goal either. We first need to be in a state where we are capable of reproducing the distributed artifacts. Then we can investigate the boostrap problem. Which is why Reproducible Builds is also invested in this problem :) There is a yearly summit with projects that contribute to reproducible builds. Last year in Paris there where 3 sessions on bootstrapping [3][4][5]. The sessions where mostly lead by Guix developers if I recall correctly, and they have been doing great progress on this problem [6]. (I see Ludovic replied first but sent it regardless :D) [1]: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 [2]: https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ [3]: https://reproducible-builds.org/events/paris2018/report/#Toc11358_331763073 [4]: https://reproducible-builds.org/events/paris2018/report/#Toc11376_331763073 [5]: https://reproducible-builds.org/events/paris2018/report/#Toc11402_331763073 [6]: https://guix.gnu.org/blog/2019/guix-reduces-bootstrap-seed-by-50/ -- Morten Linderud PGP: 9C02FF419FECBE16
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Current thread:
- Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Georgi Guninski (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Morten Linderud (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Stuart D. Gathman (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Tim Kuijsten (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Ludovic Courtès (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Morten Linderud (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Pavel Heimlich (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Jakub Wilk (Nov 19)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Solar Designer (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Russ Allbery (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Solar Designer (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Mark Hatle (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Russ Allbery (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Aditya Sirish Arunkumar Yelgundhalli (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Bob Friesenhahn (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Jeremy Stanley (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Bob Friesenhahn (Nov 20)
- Re: Mitigating malicious packages in gnu/linux Morten Linderud (Nov 19)