oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: Travis CI MITM RCE


From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg () fifthhorseman net>
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 08:52:25 -0400

On Sat 2018-10-27 16:54:46 +0200, Jakub Wilk wrote:
My proposed fix was to use "gpg --recv-key" with full fingerprint. But I 
now discovered that even this is not resistant against MitM attacks:

https://dev.gnupg.org/T3398

"[...] modern gpg automatically applies an import screener that only 
accepts OpenPGP certificates that have the given fingerprint [...]

It may be even worse than this, because the version of gpg used by
default in travis is not "modern gpg", it's either gnupg2
2.0.22-3ubuntu1.4 or gnupg 1.4.16-1ubuntu2.6.  I don't think either of
these has the baseline "import screener" functionality, let alone a fix
for T3398 :(

    --dkg


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