oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Podbeuter podcast fetcher: remote code execution


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2017 09:59:11 -0600

On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 9:21 AM, Solar Designer <solar () openwall com> wrote:

On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 02:55:12PM +0300, Alexander Batischev wrote:
On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 09:05:44PM +0200, Solar Designer wrote:
"Instead, please start by posting about the (to be made) public issue
to oss-security (without a CVE ID), request a CVE ID from MITRE
directly, and finally "reply" to your own posting when you also have
the CVE ID to add."

I was under impression that having a CVE ID speeds up processes in
distros, and fixes are released quicker.


While this should not be the case, it often is. And TBH this is one of the
reasons I'm trying to make CVE easier.


This might be the case for some issues and some distros, such as when
having a CVE ID is deemed to indicate the issue is serious or has to be
patched for publicity reasons.  It may be that it's easier to ignore an
issue that doesn't yet have a CVE ID, publicity-wise.

While CVE IDs are helpful for tracking, they should not be required, so
if a distro technically can't promptly process issues without CVE IDs (I
am unaware of such cases), they need to revise their processes anyhow.


This is also not true, many orgs (probably not open source distros run by
volunteers, but more big corps) literally do have a clock start ticking
when a CVE comes to light, I know for Red Hat it doesn't matter if the
issue has a CVE or not (we obviously prefer to have one as it makes talking
about it and coordinating a response easier), but I can't speak for others
obviously.



Was my impression wrong?

I'm unaware of statistics to confirm or disprove your impression.  If
someone has such data and analysis, please share.

Intuitively, I'd expect having or lacking a CVE ID to affect priority
more than it affects capability to track.  Ideally it shouldn't affect
either, but realistically I expect that it sometimes does.


Yup.



I just want to do things "right", so that
attackers have as little time as possible to exploit users. (I do
realize this all is best-effort and distros might still take time to
release, and then users might take ages to upgrade.)

You're talking about the window of exposure: time period since public
disclosure of an issue and until it gets patched.  However, this metric
varies across users and distros, and it's not the only metric.  It's
also desirable to get the issue known and fixed sooner.  Now, an extra
three weeks (as in your most recent case) isn't unacceptably bad as long
as the chances of abuse or leaks during this period are low, but you do
slightly increase this risk by reporting to MITRE.  Although I'm unaware
of evidence there's ever been abuse by or leaks from MITRE, and there
have been fairly convincing statements to the contrary, I think it's
good practice to avoid or at least minimize the pre-public-disclosure
exposure to MITRE as it serves no other purpose than getting CVE IDs
assigned, which in my opinion does not justify even minor risk.

Now that I had an experience of waiting for three weeks, I'll also
re-consider if I want to become a CNA for my project. Previously it
seemed like a hassle; I'm not so sure now.

This does seem like a hassle to me.  Probably not worth it.  Publicly
disclosing without CVE IDs and adding them later is probably better.
You can always use your own tracking IDs to add clarify (so that e.g.
different issues are not erroneously lumped together), or use OVE IDs:

http://www.openwall.com/ove/

then associate them with CVE IDs when you have those, such as in a
revision of your advisory.  See e.g. how Xen publishes revised versions
of their advisories when they add CVE IDs.

Alexander




-- 

Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert () redhat com

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