[OSSN-0081] sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing

[Luke Hinds <lhinds () redhat com>]

sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing
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### Summary ###

Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior
to Pike, is insufficient and provides limited protection against
brute-forcing of password hashes.

### Affected Services / Software ###
OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton.

### Discussion ###

Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides
insufficient and limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a
low computational cost factor, therefore making it easier to crack
passwords offline in a short period of time.

The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with
a higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or
pbkdf2_sha512 instead of sha512_crypt.

### Recommended Actions ###

It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all
future passwords would be bcrypt hashed.

Operators should also force password changes on all users [1], which
will result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed.

### Contacts / References ###
Author: Luke Hinds <lhinds () redhat com>
[1]:
https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-security-compliance.html#force-users-to-change-password-upon-first-use
[2] http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf
This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081
Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503
Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-dev () lists openstack org
OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg

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