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Re: ***UNCHECKED*** [oss-security] UnRAR: directory traversal + memory safety bugs


From: Marcus Meissner <meissner () suse de>
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 12:13:23 +0200

Hi,

I filed a generic CVE request at the Mitre CVE Webform for this E-Mail.

Ciao, Marcus
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 12:39:48AM +0200, Jakub Wilk wrote:
(I'm not sure UnRAR bugs are on-topic here. UnRAR is not free software, even
though the source is available. But the last time UnRAR was discussed nobody
objected, so hey, let me try too.)

I found directory traversal and a few memory safety bugs in UnRAR 5.5.6.
These bugs have been fixed in UnRAR 5.5.7.

The memory safety bugs were found using American Fuzzy Lop.

Here are details of the bugs:

* Directory traversal

The PoC (traversal.rar) contains two symlinks and a regular file:

  cur -> .
  cur/par -> ..
  par/moo

This setup defeats UnRAR's directory traversal protections:

  $ ls ../moo
  /bin/ls: cannot access '../moo': No such file or directory

  $ unrar x traversal.rar
  ...
  Extracting  cur                                                       OK
  Extracting  cur/par                                                   OK
  Extracting  par/moo                                                   OK
  All OK

  $ ls ../moo
  ../moo

The code that was used to generate the PoC is available here:
https://github.com/jwilk/path-traversal-samples


* Out-of-bounds read in Archive::ReadHeader15 / EncodeFileName::Decode

The Archive::ReadHeader15 method contains the following code (with boring
parts omitted):

  size_t NameSize=Raw.Get2();
  // ...
  char FileName[NM*4];
  size_t ReadNameSize=Min(NameSize,ASIZE(FileName)-1);
  Raw.GetB((byte *)FileName,ReadNameSize);
  FileName[ReadNameSize]=0;

  if (FileBlock)
  {
    if ((hd->Flags & LHD_UNICODE)!=0)
    {
      EncodeFileName NameCoder;
      size_t Length=strlen(FileName);
      Length++;
      NameCoder.Decode(FileName,(byte *)FileName+Length,
                       NameSize-Length,hd->FileName,
                       ASIZE(hd->FileName));
  // ...

If NameSize is bigger than NM*4, this can make EncodeFileName::Decode read
past the bounds of the FileName array.

PoC: oob-archive-readheader15.rar


* Out-of-bounds reads in Unpack::Unpack20

This method contains:

    int DistNumber=DecodeNumber(Inp,&BlockTables.DD);
    unsigned int Distance=DDecode[DistNumber]+1;

The array size is 48; but for the PoC (oob-unpack-unpack20.rar), DistNumber
is 58.


* Buffer overflow in Unpack::LongLZ

This method contains:

  ChSetB[DistancePlace]=ChSetB[NewDistancePlace];

The array size is 256; but for the PoC (oob-unpack-longlz.rar),
DistancePlace is 256.

-- 
Jakub Wilk






-- 
Marcus Meissner,SUSE LINUX GmbH; Maxfeldstrasse 5; D-90409 Nuernberg; Zi. 3.1-33,+49-911-740 
53-432,,serv=loki,mail=wotan,type=real <meissner () suse de>


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