kedpm: Information leak via the command history file

[anarcat () orangeseeds org (Antoine Beaupré)]

A vulnerability was discovered in the kedpm password manager that may
expose the master password when changed, if passed on the commandline.

Example, good:

kedpm> passwd
New password:
Repeat password:
Password changed.
kedpm>

Example, bad:

kedpm:/> passwd bar
Password changed

The former will show "passwd" in the ~/.kedpm/history file while the
latter will show "passwd bar" in the history file, divulging the
password in clear text.

Also, all password *names* that are created or consulted are saved in
the history file, something that users may not expect (although you have
to wonder how they thought history worked).

This is documented in the Debian bugtracker:

https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860817

But I would like to get a CVE assigned for wider diffusion.

Note that I seem to be the sole kedpm maintainer left and I consider the
software abandoned. I will backport patches to fix this in the Debian
bugtracker, but I have filed a request for the software to be removed
from Debian and all users should switch away.

Thanks,

a.

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