oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request: Plone Sandbox escape vulnerability


From: <cve-assign () mitre org>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 11:33:57 -0500

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[] Accessing private content via `str.format` in through-the-web templates
and scripts. See this blog post by Armin Ronacher (
http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/) for the
general idea. Since the `format` method was introduced in Python 2.6, this
part of the hotfix is only relevant for Plone 4 and 5, not Plone 3.
    Credit: Plone security team, Armin Ronacher
    Reference: https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20170117/sandbox-escape

Versions Affected:
4.3.11 and any earlier 4.x version, 5.0.6 and any earlier 5.x version

Code fixes:
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/Products.PloneHotfix20170117

Use CVE-2017-5524.

The scope of this CVE does not include the "reflected Cross Site
Scripting attack (XSS) in the ZMI (manage_findResult)" mentioned on
the PloneHotfix20170117 page. If that still needs a CVE ID, please let
us know.

In the http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/ post,
the exploitation scenarios are:

    untrusted translators on string files. This is a big one because
    many applications that are translated into multiple languages will
    use new-style Python string formatting and not everybody will vet
    all the strings that come in.

We do not feel that a CVE would have been needed if this were the only
exploitation scenario. We do not think there is a security boundary
between "people who can contribute arbitrary code to a product" and
"people who can contribute code that expresses translations." However,
it is possible that an open-source project exists somewhere with a
completely untrusted channel for translators.

    user exposed configuration. One some systems users might be
    permitted to configure some behavior and that might be exposed as
    format strings. In particular I have seen it where users can
    configure notification mails, log message formats or other basic
    templates in web applications.

This one seems completely valid, and might be the primary exploitation
scenario for CVE-2017-5524.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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