oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE-2016-2178: OpenSSL DSA follows a non-constant time codepath for certain operations


From: Marcus Meissner <meissner () suse de>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 17:38:57 +0200

Hi,

the openssl team usually announces those LOW issues together with the other
issues during their semi regular advisories.

(And usually as soon as these LOW CVE issues are getting added to git, a
new advisory is not far away.)

Ciao, Marcus
On Wed, Jun 08, 2016 at 05:33:35PM +0200, Gsunde Orangen wrote:
... which would be a different rating to the "moderate" that the RedHat
team ended up with: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-2178
I agree that both ratings are reasonable; so still awaiting for the OpenSSL
announcement at least in the vulnerability section (
https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#y2016).
(Could be that I am just too impatient ;-)

2016-06-08 17:18 GMT+02:00 Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor () gmail com>:

I assume the OpenSSL team considers this vulnerability to be LOW severity:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html

Alex

On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 11:15 AM, Gsunde Orangen <gsunde.orangen () gmail com>
wrote:

Whilst there is a commit in openssl and a CVE ID, I wonder why this
hasn't
been announced yet by OpenSSL.org and why there are no official fix
releases (yet).
What made this issue different to the usual coordinated disclosures being
practiced with the OpenSSL team?

2016-06-08 10:54 GMT+02:00 Solar Designer <solar () openwall com>:

Hi,

Just off Twitter:

<mjos_crypto> Out today: This is the OpenSSL side-channel
vulnerability I
mentioned last week; now on ePrint. Also CVE-2016-2178.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594
<@mjos_crypto> @mjos_crypto Currently unfixed in essentially all
distros.
<mjos_crypto> Note that CVE-2016-2178 /
http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594.pdf most severely actually impacts
OpenSSH, which uses the OpenSSL library.
<mjos_crypto> Cesar's CVE-2016-2178 patch for the OpenSSL library from
Monday.


https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2

http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594

| "Make Sure DSA Signing Exponentiations Really are Constant-Time''
|
| Cesar Pereida Garca and Billy Bob Brumley and Yuval Yarom
|
| Abstract: TLS and SSH are two of the most commonly used protocols for
securing Internet traffic. Many of the implementations of these
protocols
rely on the cryptographic primitives provided in the OpenSSL library.
In
this work we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all
versions
and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October 2005,
which
renders the implementation of the DSA signature scheme vulnerable to
cache-based side-channel attacks. Exploiting the software defect, we
demonstrate the first published cache-based key-recovery attack on
these
protocols: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA host key
from
an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a 2048/256-bit
DSA
key from an stunnel server.
|
| Category / Keywords: applied cryptography; digital signatures;
side-channel analysis; timing attacks; cache-timing attacks; DSA;
OpenSSL;
CVE-2016-2178
|
| Date: received 6 Jun 2016, last revised 7 Jun 2016




https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2

| author        Cesar Pereida
|       Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300 (12:45 +0300)
| committer     Matt Caswell
|       Mon, 6 Jun 2016 13:08:15 +0300 (11:08 +0100)

| Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
|
| Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time
in
| order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
| implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed
for
| certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
| attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA
key.
|
| CVE-2016-2178

Alexander





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