Re: CVE Request: Linux: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface'

[Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud () opteya com>]

Hi,

Le samedi 07 mai 2016 à 06:22 +0200, Salvatore Bonaccorso a écrit :
> Jann Horn reported an issue in the infiniband stack. It has been
> fixed
> in v4.6-rc6 with commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/linus/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
>
> > IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
> > The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
> > bi-directional ioctl().  This is not safe. There are ways to
> > trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
> > is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
> > specified kernel memory instead.
> >
> > For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
> > the write API.
> >
> > For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
> > to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
> > (likely a structured ioctl() interface).
> >
> > The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
> > hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.

As a workaround, I would suggest that systems which do not require
(userspace) RDMA/Infiniband to blacklist/remove the following modules:

  rdma_ucm
  ib_uverbs
  ib_ucm
  ib_umad

For example, adds the following in /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist.conf

  blacklist rdma_ucm
  blacklist ib_uverbs
  blacklist ib_ucm
  blacklist ib_umad

Those building their own kernel might want to disable, if not already,

  CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_ACCESS, 
  CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MAD,
  CONFIG_INFINIBAND_ADDR_TRANS

(Unfortunately the last one will also disable those features:
  iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER)
  iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target support
  RDS over Infiniband and iWARP
  9P RDMA Transport (Experimental)
  RPC-over-RDMA transport
    (which actually disable NFSoRDMA))

Regards.

-- 
Yann Droneaud
OPTEYA