oss-sec mailing list archives

Older OpenSSL RSA key/64 bit bug (now with added CVE!)


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 10:47:11 -0600

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <cve-assign () mitre org>
Date: Wed, May 4, 2016 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Re: [oss-security] broken RSA keys
To: solar () openwall com
Cc: cve-assign () mitre org, kseifried () redhat com


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On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 07:50:24AM -0600, Kurt Seifried wrote:
Is this something we should look at with respect to CVE assignment (ala
CVE-2008-0166)?

The old OpenSSL bug from 2000 could get a CVE from 2000, since that's
when it was publicly reported

http://marc.info/?l=openssl-users&m=95961024500509

Under 64 bit HP-UX,
the problem manifests itself as RSA_F4 becoming 0x1000100010001. The bug
is that 1 is an int, and according to the ANSI C standard, shifting more
than the size of the an expression is undefined. On this architechture,
only the 5 least significant bits of the shift is used, thus 1<<32==1

Use CVE-2000-1254. The commit is:
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=db82b8f9bd432a59aea8e1014694e15fc457c2bb

(We are not sure how this CVE ID would be used. It is possible that
nobody will use this ID for OpenSSL risk management, but someone will
use this ID in deciding to pursue further research on "shifting more
than the size of an expression" issues.)

If this ID is sent in an oss-security followup, the Subject: header
should be changed to mention OpenSSL. Also, MITRE currently plans to
publish the CVE for this along with the CVEs for the OpenSSL
2016-05-03 issues, which should be very soon.

- --
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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-- 

--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert () redhat com

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