oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714
From: Bob Friesenhahn <bfriesen () simple dallas tx us>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 20:42:30 -0500 (CDT)
On Tue, 3 May 2016, Seth Arnold wrote:
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 12:05:16AM +0000, Brandon Dees wrote:is it appropriate to ask if the same issues are present in GraphicsMagick as well?I haven't investigated deeply but it seems very plausible to me: Here's the delegates.xml work-alike: https://sourceforge.net/p/graphicsmagick/code/ci/default/tree/config/delegates.mgk.in This appears to be executed via: https://sourceforge.net/p/graphicsmagick/code/ci/default/tree/magick/delegate.c which tries to escape arguments using UnixShellTextEscape(). This function appears to replace \`"$ chars with backslash-escaped versions. I'm not sure this is a safe mechanism either.
Please provide me with a working exploit.Be aware that this quoting method is only used for the few delegates.mgk rules which require shell-like syntax to work. Otherwise the external program is run using execvp() without a shell.
I am aware that the handling for Microsoft Windows is not quite secure and in fact Windows concatentates all the spawnvp() vector arguments into one long string and each program parses command line arguments using its own algorithm without a secure quoting mechanism so command-line programs can never possibly be secured.
In order to achieve the best security with GraphicsMagick (with some possible loss of function due to missing file formats), please define this environment variable:
MAGICK_CODER_STABILITY=PRIMARYUse 'gm convert -list formats' and check the second column of output to see what formats are classified as Primary, Stable, and Unstable. Primary formats are considered common and trustworthy.
There is also a way that C/C++ programs using the libraries can bless the files which will be accessed before the access occurs (not yet controlled by a configuration file).
Thanks, Bob -- Bob Friesenhahn bfriesen () simple dallas tx us, http://www.simplesystems.org/users/bfriesen/ GraphicsMagick Maintainer, http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/
Current thread:
- ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Ryan Huber (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Solar Designer (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Karim Valiev (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Seth Arnold (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Tim (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Brandon Dees (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Seth Arnold (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Seth Arnold (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Karim Valiev (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Solar Designer (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Jeremy Stanley (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Kurt Seifried (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Simon McVittie (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 John Lightsey (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 20)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Simon Lees (May 20)