oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE for crypto_get_random() from libsrtp


From: Adam Maris <amaris () redhat com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:58:10 +0200



On 11/08/15 13:48, Jeremy Stanley wrote:
On 2015-08-11 09:51:50 +0200 (+0200), Adam Maris wrote:
[...]
Unless CVE is assigned, we don't plan to ship any patch at the moment.
I find this an interesting stance. Don't you decide on your own
whether your customers are impacted by a bug sufficiently to require
a fix (security vulnerability or otherwise)? It seems reasonable to
me that you would choose whether or not to ship a patch
independently of how MITRE chooses to classify (or not) the
associated bug... and vice versa, if a CVE is assigned for a bug you
consider to have minimal impact, do you release a patch for it
anyway just because there's a CVE?
This has nothing to do with us not fixing flaws just because they don't get a CVE. I assure you that we've fixed security flaws that had no CVEs before. And if you look through our CVE database, you'll find many examples of simple crashers that unfortunately got a CVE, which we did not fix. The main reason for not fixing it for now is that we think 80 bits of randomness is enough for most applications up to this day, especially if it's session data and not permanent storage, etc. Therefore we classify this issue as having a Low security impact. If a CVE is assigned for this issue, we will create an entry in our CVE database but the end result will likely be the same, wontfix.

--
Adam Maris / Red Hat Product Security


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