CVE request: Module::Signature before 0.75 - multiple vulnerabilities

[John Lightsey <john () nixnuts net>]

Hi there,

A new version of Module::Signature, was released to fix multiple
vulnerabilities. Module::Signature is used by most CPAN clients to
validate PAUSE GPG signature files on the CPAN mirrors and GPG signature
files inside individual Perl module tarballs.

The changelog for the 0.75 version is here:

https://metacpan.org/changes/distribution/Module-Signature

This commit fixes three flaws:

https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/8a9164596fa5952d4fbcde5aa1c7d1c7bc85372f

- Module::Signature could be tricked into interpreting the unsigned
portion of a SIGNATURE file as the signed portion due to faulty parsing
of the PGP signature boundaries.

- When verifying the contents of a CPAN module, Module::Signature
ignored some files in the extracted tarball that were not listed in the
signature file. This included some files in the t/ directory that would
execute automatically during "make test"

- When generating checksums from the signed manifest, Module::Signature
used two argument open() calls to read the files. This allowed embedding
arbitrary shell commands into the SIGNATURE file that would execute
during the signature verification process.

This commit fixes one more flaw:

https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/c41e8885b862b9fce2719449bc9336f0bea658ef

- Several modules were loaded at runtime inside the extracted module
directory. Modules like Text::Diff are not guaranteed to be available on
all platforms and could be added to a malicious module so that they
would load from the '.' path in @INC.

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature