oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: CVE Request: Arbitary Code Execution in Apache Spark Cluster


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 17:18:57 -0600

You should probably CC security () apache org if you're going to pass the
decision to them rather then relying on a third party to do it (e.g.
positive control vs. "well I hope someone told them").

On 04/16/2015 04:05 PM, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:
http://codebreach.in/blog/2015/03/arbitary-code-execution-in-unsecured-apache-spark-cluster/

As far as we can tell, the essence of your report is related to:

  http://spark.apache.org/docs/latest/configuration.html
  Property Name: spark.authenticate
  Default: false
  Meaning: Whether Spark authenticates its internal connections.

If a user downloads spark-1.3.0.tgz, they will find a README.md with:

  Please refer to the [Configuration guide]
  (http://spark.apache.org/docs/latest/configuration.html)
  in the online documentation for an overview on how to configure
  Spark.

Also, because the product is advertised as a "general-purpose cluster
computing system," we think that downloaders would typically have some
experience in system or network administration, and should be able to
recognize whether a trusted network exists for all "internal
connections."

It's conceivable that the documentation should be expanded to further
discuss the risks of the default spark.authenticate value. MITRE is
not going to assign a CVE ID for this. It is a judgment call for the
upstream vendor. Because the upstream vendor has a process for
assigning CVE IDs, we feel it would be simplest and best here to use
that process, even if it is often not used in cases of publicly known
vulnerabilities. See the security () apache org address on the
http://www.apache.org/security/committers.html page. It's their
decision on how to proceed.



-- 
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
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