oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: FreeBSD: URGENT: RNG broken for last 4 months


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 21:43:15 -0700

On 18/02/15 09:03 PM, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:
If you are running a current kernel r273872 or later, please upgrade

Our perspective at this point is that FreeBSD-CURRENT is not a
"software product" and typically should not have CVE assignments. If
anyone on the FreeBSD Security Officer Team believes that this, for
whatever reason, is a case where FreeBSD-CURRENT should have a CVE, we
are willing to go with their preference.

quite a few people run -current (and it's a 4 month affected window),
so if we're assigning CVE's to stuff hosted in github, then it seems
fair

A project on github can be a software product if the developers choose
to use github that way. FreeBSD-CURRENT is, for example, advertised as
"any given commit is just as likely to introduce new bugs as to fix
existing ones"
(https://www.freebsd.org/doc/en/books/handbook/current-stable.html).
The defined use cases for FreeBSD-CURRENT don't suggest that it has
any expected behavior, security-wise or otherwise: it is just a point
in the development process. Also, we don't happen to know of
situations where third parties repackage and support FreeBSD-CURRENT
code (e.g., as the embedded OS of an appliance).

I respectfully disagree due to the fact that FreeBSD gives explicit
instructions on running current:

https://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/current-stable.html

and even places it above using -stable in the order in the book. Looking
at the instructions:

To track FreeBSD-CURRENT:

Join the freebsd-current and the svn-src-head lists. This is essential
in order to see the comments that people are making about the current
state of the system and to receive important bulletins about the current
state of FreeBSD-CURRENT.

if you look at those mailing lists you will see there are a ton of
posters, so obviously more than a few people are using this.

Any ways just my 5 cents, I don't think it's a good precedent to set
that "oh the vendor says this is beta/not supported/etc so no CVE" when:

1) a lot of people use it (e.g. Google Chrome was a "beta", but it  had
several million users so it got CVEs)
2) the affected timeframe was quite significant (4 months, so for yearly
key roll over that's 1/3 of the population affected)
3) the problem can linger on despite the system being updated (e.g. any
certs/keys need to be re-generated).




-- 
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
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