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Re: GHOST gethostbyname() heap overflow in glibc (CVE-2015-0235)


From: endrazine <endrazine () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 17:47:47 -0800

Dear Qualys team, dear list,

???

I assume this is an invitation to elaborate ;)

From GHOST.c :
...
  char name[10];
  memset(name, '0', len);
  name[len] = '\0';
...


len is worth 991 at that point in time. Quite clearly, this will not fit
into 10 bytes :)

I am merely mentioning it in case anyone else was trying to run this code
and was hitting this particular stack overflow.

It is till an epic bug, congratulations on finding it !

Best regards,

j-

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 4:00 PM, Qualys Security Advisory <qsa () qualys com>
wrote:

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 02:03:10PM -0800, endrazine wrote:
There is an obvious stack overflow in Qualys' GHOST.c poc : the name
buffer
is 10 bytes long and 900+ bytes of data are copied to it. This is

???

--
QSA


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