oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request: ro bind mount bypass using user namespaces


From: Kenton Varda <kenton () sandstorm io>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 00:18:40 -0700

I'm happy with however you want to assign credit here, but for
clarification:

I actually observed that all these bits could be modified. My first
observation was with nosuid. But, I thought they were just the same issue
applied to different bits in the same bitfield. I specifically used the RO
bit in my PoC. Looking back, it looks like I didn't explicitly point out
which other bits were affected, but Eric quickly re-discovered them, and
also discovered from reviewing the code that the other bits had even fewer
guards against modification compared to the RO bit.

Andrew Lutomirski has further discovered that this problem can be used to
escalate a regular user to root privileges on typical Linux configurations,
independent of any sandboxing effort.

Thanks,
-Kenton

On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 10:49 PM, <cve-assign () mitre org> wrote:

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We are assigning two CVE IDs because the available information is that
there were two discoverers. Even if the discoverer information is
later clarified, there will still be these two CVE IDs.


https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git/commit/?h=for-linus&id=db181ce011e3c033328608299cd6fac06ea50130

Kenton Varda <kenton () sandstorm io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.

Use CVE-2014-5206.



https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git/commit/?h=for-linus&id=9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705

While investigating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

Use CVE-2014-5207.

- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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