oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Postfix bounces arbitrary content


From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 09:47:20 -0600

On 05/06/2014, at 19:57 PM, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:

take 5,000 randomly selected articles from my local news spool, and
cause b.com to bounce all of them from bob () b com to postmaster () a com.
This will likely cause a.com to block incoming mail from bob () b com,
or from all of b.com

It seems more likely that the default configuration would produce
bounce messages with a header From: address starting with
"MAILER-DAEMON@" and an empty envelope-sender address. In that case,
blocking mail from bob () b com wouldn't accomplish anything. But it's
conceivable that the a.com administrator would start blocking the IP
address of the b.com SMTP server.

That's a detail that doesn't have much effect on the CVE inclusion
question.

Originating a new message to report non-delivery is valid according to
RFC 2821 section 6.1. It's not really the case that there's inherently
an integrity impact.

There could be a Postfix developer announcement that, according to
their security policy, this is unintended behavior with an integrity
impact. A CVE assignment would be possible in that case.

(To summarize: just because the RFC 2821 section 6.1 behavior is
allowed doesn't mean that it's a good idea. An SMTP server should
minimize the situations in which outsiders can trigger an arbitrary
volume of outbound SMTP traffic to arbitrary destination IP addresses.
Non-deliverability should be detected within the original SMTP dialog,
and this case of the Delivered-To: header doesn't seem impossible to
detect. However, there might be some type of architectural motivation
for not checking the Delivered-To: header within the original SMTP
dialog. Even if it was originally intentional, the developer might
accept a feature request to change it.)

This is perfect.  Thank you.  It also confirmed what I expected (and upstream should have its say here).  I think that, 
given it was initially reported a decade ago, that that gives some hint as to how they may feel about it.

At any rate, thank you for your feedback.


-- 
Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team

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