Re: Re: cups-browsed remote exploit

[Jamie Strandboge <jamie () canonical com>]

On 04/02/2014 03:18 PM, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:
> > For this it creates a filter-script
>
> > snprintf
>
> > "%s/filter/pdftoippprinter \"$1\" \"$2\" \"$3\" \"$4\" \"$5 $extra_options\"\n",
> > p->name, pdl, make_model, cups_serverbin);
>
> > its easy to inject code to the script e.g. via model name or pdl key
> > which is taken from the LAN packets.
>
> Use CVE-2014-2707.

This issue was reported as fixed in 1.0.51:
http://bzr.linuxfoundation.org/loggerhead/openprinting/cups-filters/revision/7188

but it was found that the fix was incomplete with the full fix in 1.0.53:
http://bzr.linuxfoundation.org/loggerhead/openprinting/cups-filters/revision/7194

Should this get a second CVE or should we continue to use CVE-2014-2707?

Furthermore, another security issue was also fixed in 1.0.53:
http://bzr.linuxfoundation.org/loggerhead/openprinting/cups-filters/revision/7195

"
- cups-browsed: SECURITY FIX: Fix on usage of the
  "BrowseAllow" directive in cups-browsed.conf. Before, if the
  argument of a "BrowseAllow" directive is not understood it
  is treated as the directive not having been there, allowing
  any host if this was the only "BrowseAllow" directive. Now
  we treat this as a directive which no host can fulfill, not
  allowing any host if it was the only one. No "BrowseAllow"
  directive means access for all, as before (Bug #1204).
"

I believe this should receive a CVE.

Thanks

References:
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=871327
https://bugs.linuxfoundation.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1204

-- 
Jamie Strandboge                 http://www.ubuntu.com/

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