oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE-2014-0021: chrony traffic amplification in cmdmon protocol


From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen () redhat com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 17:47:26 -0700

On 01/17/2014, at 17:39 PM, cve-assign () mitre org wrote:

With the news about the traffic amplification issue in ntpd, one of
our developers looked at chronyd

At cve-assign () mitre org, we've received a number of reports that have
protocol descriptions, and ask for CVE assignments for amplification
attacks. We've declined making assignments for those. One of the
criteria we're currently using is:

- cases in which a vendor of a UDP protocol implementation announces
  that they made a security-relevant mistake by having configuration
  or code elements that allow amplification attacks, and publishes
  a fix for this mistake

One of the other CVE Numbering Authorities was also receiving similar
reports. We coordinated with them and learned that they were looking
at CVE eligibility in much the same way.

The "in which a vendor of a UDP protocol implementation" above was
what we had for the CVE-2013-5211 ntpd issue (with some definition of
"announces"). We don't know the ultimate outcome of how amplification
attacks will interact with the scope of CVE, but we did want to point
out that this CVE-2014-0021 assignment seemed inconsistent with what
we've been doing.

Is this not a same/similar case?  chronyd, much like ntpd, has some commands that allow for amplification, just like 
ntpd does.

I'm not going to argue (I didn't assign it, I'm just reporting that it was assigned), but it struck me as being 
essentially the same type of flaw.  So if ntpd received a CVE for essentially the same thing, I can see why this one 
was assigned as well.

I'm not sure which part is inconsistent here.  Granted, chrony does not yet have a published fix, but my understanding 
is that is in the works.  In other words, there will be a fix of some sort (to at least reduce the amplification quite 
substantially).  Is that the part that seemed inconsistent?  The lack of a published fix?

-- 
Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team

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