oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request for saltstack minion identity usurpation


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 00:20:08 -0600

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On 10/15/2013 11:54 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
On 10/11/2013 04:26 PM, Michael Scherer wrote:
Hi,

While looking for saltstack issues on github, i stumbled on this 
pull request : https://github.com/saltstack/salt/pull/7356

It seems that saltstack, a client/server configuration system ( 
like puppet, chef, cfengine ) allowed to have any minions (
agent on the server to be configured ) to masquerade itself as
any others agents when requesting stuff from the master ( ie,
main server ). While I didn't fully check, this would permit a
compromised server to request data from another server, thus
leading to potential informations leak ( like passwword, etc ).

Can a CVE be assigned, and I will pass it to upstream on the bug
 report ?

Ok mmcallis@ researched these and found:

CVE-2013-4435 saltstack Insufficient argument validation in
several modules

CVE-2013-4436 saltstack MITM ssh attack on salt-ssh

CVE-2013-4437 saltstack Insecure usage of a predictable directory
in /tmp and on minion (CVE MERGE of two tmp issues)

CVE-2013-4438 saltstack pillar.ext or qemu_nbd.clear yaml string
RCE

Argh. The above are currently embargoed, I misunderstood and thought
they were public (along with the following one). My apologies,
especially to upstream and users of saltstack. Adding saltstack info@
to the CC (can't find a security address).

CVE-2013-4439 saltstack minion identity usurpation



- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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