oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request: TYPO3-CORE-SA-2013-003


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Mon, 09 Sep 2013 14:04:02 -0600

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On 09/07/2013 02:14 AM, Henri Salo wrote:
Could you assign two 2013 CVE identifiers for following issues,
thanks. We have agreed with Helmut Hummel that I'm requesting TYPO3
CVEs in the future using private method from: 
http://people.redhat.com/kseifrie/CVE-OpenSource-Request-HOWTO.html

 
http://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-core/typo3-core-sa-2013-003

 Component Type: TYPO3 Core Vulnerability Types: Cross-Site
Scripting, Remote Code Execution Overall Severity: Critical Release
Date: September 4, 2013

#1 CVE-2013-XXXX

Vulnerable subcomponent: File handling / File Abstraction Layer 
Vulnerability Type: Incomplete Access Management Affected Versions:
All versions from 6.0.0 up to the development branch of 6.2 
Severity: Medium Suggested CVSS v2.0:
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C

Problem Description: TYPO3 comes with the possibility to restrict
editors to certain file actions (copy, delete, move etc.) and to
restrict these actions to be performed in certain locations (file
mounts). This permission handling was only partly implemented with
the introduction of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL). The file
action permissions that can be set in backend user and group 
records were not respected and users could break out of file mounts
by crafting URLs. Thus, unprivileged users could create or read
arbitrary files within or outside the document root.

Solution: Update to the TYPO3 version 6.0.9, 6.1.4 or the latest
development version! It is important to clear all caches (clear
cache all in the backend or deleting the complete typo3temp/Cache
directory) for the changes to take effect after the TYPO3 source
files have been updated!

Notes: Administrators are advised to set file permissions for
backend users or groups by using user TS Config instead of using
the file permission check boxes in the user or group records. This
allows more fine grained control for single file action
permissions. Examples in the advisory.

Credits: Credits go to Sebastian Nerz who discovered and reported
the issues, Steffen Ritter and Helmut Hummel for creating the fixes
and Anja Leichsenring, Susanne Moog, Michiel Roos, Sascha Egerer
and Ernesto Baschny for testing.

Please use CVE-2013-4320 for this issue.

#2 CVE-2013-XXXX

Vulnerable subcomponent: File Abstraction Layer Vulnerability Type:
Remote Code Execution Affected Versions: All versions from 6.0.0 up
to the development branch of 6.2 Severity: Critical Suggested CVSS
v2.0: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:O/RC:C

Problem Description: The check for denied file extensions
implemented in the File Abstraction Layer as mentioned in advisory
TYPO3-CORE-SA-2013-002 was incomplete. It was still possible for
editors to rename files to have denied file extensions by inserting
special characters that were removed at a later point. This (again)
allowed authenticated editors to forge php files with arbitrary
code, which can then be executed in web server's context.

Solution: Update to the TYPO3 version 6.0.9, 6.1.4 or the latest
development version!

Please use CVE-2013-4321 for this issue.

Credits: Credits go to Sascha Egerer who discovered and reported
the issue.

--- Henri Salo



- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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