oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: [PATCH] implement privmode support in dash


From: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel () suse de>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 14:33:19 +0200

Simon McVittie wrote:
On 22/08/13 18:59, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
After researching this sort of thing a bit a few months ago, I'm of the
opinion that any set*id executable that doesn't filter its environment
through a whitelist is Doing It Wrong.

I'd go one step further and claim that anyone using a setuid program to
solve anything is doing it wrong in the first place :-)

Unfortunately, many set*id executables don't do that: notably, many
su(8) implementations call into PAM (and hence into arbitrary
distribution- or sysadmin-chosen libraries) with a caller-supplied
environment. I think sudo might do the same, but it wasn't clear to me.

That's kind of mandatory. Some pam modules rely on having access to the
calling user's environment (pam_xauth or pam_krb5 for example IIRC).

I asked the PAM mailing list what their security policy is[1] but
haven't seen any reply so far.

I doubt there is any policy. Has PAM evolved at all the last few years?

Wrt su IMHO replacing that setuid binary with an implementation that
uses a client/server model (think of a local ssh) is long overdue.
su (and sudo) as is just doesn't fit into todays world anymore. The
security issues are just one symptom of that.

cu
Ludwig

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