oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request for a Drupal contributed module


From: Forest Monsen <forest.monsen () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 11:22:39 -0700

Hi Kurt, regarding CVE assignment and your request for clarification at
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/05/16/2:

On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 6:41 PM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com> wrote:

This sounds like two separate issues:
[...]
can you send me the code patches fixing this so I can make sure it
gets the correct SPLIT/MERGE treatment? Thanks.

Yep - Diffs for the commits that fixed both of these issues are at:

Drupal 6: http://drupalcode.org/project/ga_login.git/commitdiff/dd04ea3
 Drupal 7: http://drupalcode.org/project/ga_login.git/commitdiff/c365097

For the first issue,


Accidental removal of account configuration.

In certain scenarios, Google Authenticator login incorrectly
determines the user's account name. The change in account name could
cause the two-factor authentication for existing accounts to be lost,
allowing users to log in using just username and password.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact while Google Authenticator
login's additional verification is by-passed, a username and password
are still required to log in.


It looks like the maintainer now concatenates a "Realm" (site name) and
suffix with the Drupal username to form the GA username. Any inconsistency
there will invalidate earlier credentials.

For the second,

One Time Password (OTP) replay

If an attacker can intercept a login request with a username, password
and OTP, an attacker could use this same data again to login to the
website.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that an attacker who can
intercept a login request with this level of detail can usually also
intercept the ongoing session identifying token.


It looks to me like the maintainer now implements a skew value to either
(in the case of a time-based one-time password token) review only a certain
range of timed tokens on either side, or (in the case of an HMAC-based
one-time password token) to again test a range of tokens.

I'll copy the Drupal Security Team, in case I haven't understood it
correctly or if further clarification is necessary. Thanks.

Best,
Forest

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