oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Re: CVE request: radsecproxy incorrect x.509 certificate validation


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 09:23:38 -0600

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On 10/30/2012 01:46 PM, Raphael Geissert wrote:
Hi again,

On Wednesday 17 October 2012 12:48:19 Raphael Geissert wrote:
Ralf Paffrath discovered that radsecproxy may incorrectly accept
a client certificate if the certificates chain was validated with
the CA settings of one configuration block but the other
certificate constraints failed, and the certificate constraints
of another configuration block passed (ignoring this other config
block's CA settings.)

This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.1. However, it
introduces a minor regression as it ignores some configuration
blocks (see the references for further details.)

While checking the issue I noticed that the same issue also affects
 radsecproxy's DTLS support, which was not fixed. Upstream has now
released version 1.6.2 addressing the vulnerability in its DTLS
support code.

Now, the thing is that upstream re-used the previously assigned CVE
id CVE-2012-4523. According to the guidelines a new id should be
assigned since they affect different versions even if the issues
are related.

So, I guess a new id is in order?

References: 
http://git.nordu.net/?p=radsecproxy.git;a=commit;h=3682c935facf5ccd7fa600644bbb76957155c680


https://postlister.uninett.no/sympa/arc/radsecproxy/2012-10/msg00001.html
https://project.nordu.net/browse/RADSECPROXY-43

Regards,

Correct, different versions = different CVEs typically. Please use
CVE-2012-4566  for this issue. For reference:

http://cve.mitre.org/cve/editorial_policies/cd_abstraction.html

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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