oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE id request: Multiple buffer overflow in unixODBC


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 23:22:50 -0600

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On 05/31/2012 08:44 AM, Tomas Hoger wrote:
On Wed, 30 May 2012 13:02:53 -0600 Kurt Seifried wrote:

On 05/30/2012 11:40 AM, Felipe Pena wrote:

It isn't limited to the configuration files. Such input can be 
passed to the `isql' interactive tool that come together
unixODBC. The same string can be used to connect through PHP
PDO, for example.

Agree, anything that parses such connect string can be crashed
this way.  The question is if any trust boundary is crossed with
that, which depends on whether there are any apps that allow
untrusted connect strings.

$ ./isql "FILEDSN=$(python -c "print 'A'*10000");UID=user" -k

Anyone having shell access to run isql directly should be assumed
to have ability to edit ~/.odbcinst.ini, which should be enough to
crash isql or inject code to it without having to trigger one of
the mentioned overflows.

Is this something that an attacker can typically control, or does
the PHP author need to write code that does this?

For PHP applications, would you assume attacker can typically
control settings as database name, host, port or username?  It's
not really quite common.  Possible use cases that come to mind:

- DB management application similar to phpMyAdmin, that may take
some DB connection info as input from user.  If something like that
exists for ODBC, another question would be if the info from user
can actually be used to sneak in values for FILEDSN or DRIVER. - Of
course, this may allow safe_mode bypass, which may not be possible 
via odbcinst.ini (e.g. PHP script may not be allowed to edit it
and safe_mode does not allow setting ODBCINSTINI environment
variable).


Forgot to follow up, in light of this I think it's safe to let the CVE
stand as is.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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