Re: CVE for OpenBSD random() bug?

["Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller () courtesan com>]

> It would seem this fits into the "weaker then advertised" class of
> security problem. Thoughts/comments (anyone strongly against this)?

Since random(3) is not a cryptographically secure random function
I'm not sure that is makes sense to assign a CVE.

I suppose it really depends on the likelihood of someone calling
srandom(0); I don't know why anyone would do that on purpose.  If
you must use random(3) instead of something stronger like arc4random(3),
it is possible to seed the PRNG via /dev/arandom using srandomdev(3)
or set the seed state manually via initstate(3), both of which
provide more than just 32 bits of seed data.

 - todd