oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: vsftpd download backdoored


From: HD Moore <hdm () digitaloffense net>
Date: Mon, 04 Jul 2011 22:31:07 -0500

On 7/4/2011 9:26 PM, Solar Designer wrote:
On Tue, Jul 05, 2011 at 10:09:32AM +0800, Eugene Teo wrote:
I did not verify.

(09:55:37 AM) hdmoore: The timestamp on vsftpd-2.3.4.tar.gz
http://bit.ly/j4VC5y indicates that the backdoor was present from Feb
15th -> July 3rd (via mc)

Looks unrealistic to me.  Feb 15 is when 2.3.4 was released by Chris.
A copy I downloaded has mtime Feb 15 (preserved from the official
download site) and ctime Mar 2 (when I downloaded it).  It passes the
GPG signature check and lacks the backdoor.

Additionally, searching for the SHA-256 digest that Chris posted reveals
only copies of his announcement of the incident and news stories about
it.  No hits for any distro's filelists, etc.  I wish we had MD5 and
SHA-1 to also search for, though.  I don't have a copy of the backdoored
vsftpd tarball to compute those, but we can ask Chris for them.

My gut feeling is that the backdoored tarball has been on the site for
1 to 3 days.  But I could be wrong.

Thanks for the CC -- as a guess as to what happened; was this particular
mirror compromised and the original tarball modified (along with its
mtime) to match the original Feb 15th date?

Does anyone have a "we noticed it first" flag that is before July 3rd?

Debian (and most other repos) are storing the SHA-256/SHA1/MD5 of each
source package, so a Feb 15 date does seem incredible, but so does the
complete pwnage of a non-official mirror with the original mtime, at the
same moment as an official dist server compromise. A nightly rsync would
account for this, but we would need to know more about the mirror
structure from Chris.

I am happy to correct the metasploit module if new facts arrive; thank
you to everyone who spends their free time dealing with this crap.

-HD


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