oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames
From: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller () atsec com>
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2011 14:06:46 +0100
Am Montag, 14. März 2011, um 13:56:45 schrieb Dan Rosenberg: Hi Dan,
I'd like to add that while this kind of hardening would be nice in theory, there is little urgency in making these improvements since the proposed attack vectors are extremely limited. As I see it, there are four scenarios where this might matter:
I am not so sure that all the following is unlikely:
1. An attacker convinces a victim to download an evil filesystem image and manually mount it.
I guess that is the most likely vector - how often did you download ISO images from somewhere - it is often for me? How often did you get USB drives from somebody - it happens frequently? How often did you mount them? I guess, this happened often. The concern here is that most users are very unsuspecting of the discussed issue. Most people think that you should not execute files from unknown media. But hardly anyone thinks that simply mounting the media or listing directory contents would cause problems. At least that is what I have learned. Ciao Stephan
Current thread:
- Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Vasiliy Kulikov (Mar 12)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Steve Grubb (Mar 13)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Eitan Adler (Mar 13)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Stephan Mueller (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Dan Rosenberg (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Stephan Mueller (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Steve Grubb (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Vasiliy Kulikov (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Ludwig Nussel (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Steve Grubb (Mar 14)
- Re: Untrusted fs and invalid filenames Dan Rosenberg (Mar 14)